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IV. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The recession and the drastic decline in home values have combined to
trigger a wave of foreclosures. Predictably, legislators, policymakers,
scholars, and consumer advocates have responded with a wide range of
proposals designed to protect distressed mortgagors from losing their homes.
While most attention has focused upon efforts to assist homeowners in
restructuring their mortgages-such as HUD's Hope for Homeowners' and
the Treasury's Making Home Affordable 2 programs-other legislative
proposals have focused specifically upon the foreclosure process and the
role that alternative dispute resolution plays (or can play) within that
process.3 Some proposals are relatively modest and seek to provide the
distressed borrower with an additional limited opportunity for repaying or
restructuring the loan. For example, California adopted a temporary ninety-
day moratorium on the foreclosure of residential first mortgage liens,
explicitly intended to provide additional time for homeowners to obtain loan
modifications.4 Other state legislatures have introduced bills that would
require a mortgagee to engage in mediation with the mortgagor prior to
instituting a foreclosure proceeding.5 Other proposals are more far-reaching.
Perhaps the most extreme is the recommendation of the National Consumer
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715(z)-1723(2008).
2. Making Home Affordable, http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
3. See infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
4. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2923.52-.55 (West 2009). The Act expires on January 1, 2011, and
contains an exception for mortgage servicers that have established a comprehensive loan
modification program. Id. §§ 2923.52-.53. In enacting this Act, the California legislature made the
following findings:
It is essential to the economic health of California for the state to ameliorate the
deleterious effects that will result from the continued high rate of foreclosure of
residential properties by modifying the foreclosure process to provide additional time for
borrowers to work out loan modifications while providing an exemption for mortgage
loan servicers that have implemented a comprehensive loan modification program. This
change in accessing the state's foreclosure process is essential to ensure that the process
does not exacerbate the current crisis by adding more foreclosures to the glut of
foreclosed properties already on the market if the foreclosure may be avoided through a
loan modification.
2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. 48 (West).
5. S.B. 1328, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); H.B. 4453, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2009); H.B. 354, 2009 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2009); H.B. 5492, 2009 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I.
2009).
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Law Center, which advocates that states currently permitting power of sale
foreclosure either repeal their authorizing statutes altogether or incorporate
explicit due process protections into power of sale foreclosure.6
The mortgage crisis certainly provides an opportunity to evaluate the
structure and utility of the current foreclosure process and to make
appropriate changes. But it is important that legislatures do not overreact in
doing so. To avoid an overreaction, it is important for policymakers to keep
in mind where our current foreclosure process fits within the legal system's
overall dispute resolution structure. Viewing foreclosure in this context
presents an as-yet unexplored question: Given the growing role that
arbitration processes have played in our system's overall dispute resolution
structure, could-or should-arbitration play a role in mortgage foreclosure?
Since its enactment in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)7 has
provided that agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes are generally
enforceable.8  Over the past quarter-century, the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the FAA with breathtaking expansiveness, holding that
the FAA establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration,9 preempts contrary
state law restricting arbitrability of disputes, 0 mandates the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate even federal statutory claims," and applies to an
arbitration agreement in any commercial transaction that Congress has the
6. John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws
Deprive Homeowners of Basic Protections, Feb. 2009, at 4, available at http://www.consumerlaw
.org/issues/foreclosure/content/FORE-ReportO2O9.pdf ("Many states now allow mortgage holders to
bypass the courts and use non-judicial procedures to take away homes from their owners. These
procedures create enormous barriers for homeowners who want to assert legal claims and raise
defenses against lenders, servicers, and mortgage holders. States should either completely abandon
the power of sale method and require judicial foreclosure, or they should incorporate essential due
process protections into the existing non-judicial procedure.").
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
8. Id. § 2 ("A written provision in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction .. . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."). The primary purpose of the FAA was to overturn the
"ouster" or "revocability" doctrine, under which courts had refused to enforce commercial
arbitration agreements. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 28-30 (1992); Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and
Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 285 (2007).
9. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
10. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
11. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (arbitrability of ADEA
claims); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (arbitrability of
Securities Act of 1934 claims).
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power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.12 Against this background,
the United States has experienced a dramatic expansion in the use of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in nearly all segments of commerce.
Yet despite this expansion, we have not seen lenders incorporate
foreclosure-by-arbitration clauses into mortgage documentation. This
phenomenon is quite understandable in states that permit a mortgagee to
conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Where nonjudicial foreclosure is
permitted, a mortgage lender can complete a foreclosure within a relatively
short period of time (in some states, as little as thirty to forty-five days) and
without incurring the expense associated with adjudication." In these states,
arbitration could not occur any faster than nonjudicial foreclosure and would
require the parties to incur the additional expense of adjudication.14 As a
result, a mortgagee in a power-of-sale foreclosure state has no real incentive
to offer or accept an agreement to privatize the foreclosure process through
arbitration.
The incentives are different, however, in states that require foreclosure
through judicial process and thus already require the parties to incur the
expenses of adjudication. Mortgages in these states would appear to be
plausible candidates for foreclosure-by-arbitration clauses, especially if such
a clause could permit a mortgagee to complete a foreclosure more quickly
than would be possible in the public courts (where the pace of foreclosure
litigation may be influenced by exogenous factors such as time periods
dictated by rules of civil procedure and delays dictated by state court docket
congestion).
Despite the potential advantages that foreclosure-by-arbitration clauses
could offer, such clauses have not become customary in mortgage
transactions. This article explores why this is so and whether there are any
structural legal barriers that would prevent a mortgagee from privatizing the
foreclosure process through arbitration. Parts I and II provide the
appropriate background. Part I addresses the judicial/nonjudicial foreclosure
divide in American real estate law, explaining why the potential utility of
arbitration varies depending upon what foreclosure methods a state has
legally authorized. '5 Part II provides similar background on arbitration-the
process characteristics of arbitration as compared to public adjudication, the
process values sought to be advanced by the use of arbitration, and how
these process characteristics and values are implicated in the context of
mortgage foreclosure. 16 Part III then addresses whether there are any legal
12. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-77 (1995).
13. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 20-60 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 61-113 and accompanying text.
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barriers to the use of arbitration in lieu of judicial foreclosure and concludes
that no such barriers exist."
This article focuses primarily on the descriptive question (i.e., can a
mortgage lender privatize the foreclosure process through arbitration?).
There remain substantial differences of opinion about whether mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration is just, particularly in the consumer context, and
efforts continue in Congress to amend the FAA to prohibit mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration in consumer disputes (which would include enforcement
of residential mortgages).' 8 While this article is not intended to resolve the
broader normative question (i.e., should a mortgage lender be able to
privatize the foreclosure process through arbitration?), Part IV does offer
some concluding thoughts about foreclosure-by-arbitration in the context of
residential mortgages.' 9
I. FORECLOSURE METHODS
At early common law, there were no foreclosure protections for the
borrower.20 The mortgage loan transaction involved a conveyance of fee
simple ownership to the mortgagee on condition subsequent.2 1 If the
mortgagor repaid the loan by the date specified in the language of the
condition subsequent ("law day"), the mortgagor could re-enter and
terminate the mortgagee's estate; if not, the mortgagee's fee simple title
became absolute.22
Over time, in recognition of the fact that the mortgagee had taken title to
the mortgaged premises as security for a debt, equity intervened to provide
increasing levels of relief to a mortgagor who had defaulted but nevertheless
had the capacity to repay the loan. Equity permitted a defaulting
mortgagor to redeem title from the mortgagee by paying off the full balance
of the morLgage loan as long as this payment occurred within a reasonable
time after law day.24 In addition, equity obligated the mortgagee to account
17. See infra notes 114-285 and accompanying text.
18. The pending Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 would amend FAA § 2 to provide that "[n]o
predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of (1) an
employment, consumer, or franchise dispute." H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).
19. See infra notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
20. See 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.2, at 7-8
(5th ed. 2007).
21. Id. § 1.2, at 7.
22. Id. § 1.2, at 8.
23. Id. §1.3, at 8.
24. Id.
463
for any profits received from the mortgaged premises in excess of the
amount of the debt.25  Nevertheless, because the availability of equitable
relief created a substantial cloud upon the mortgagee's title, equity also
developed a process to permit the mortgagee to extinguish the mortgagor's
ability to obtain equitable relief.2 6 In this process, which came to be known
as strict foreclosure, the mortgagee could obtain from the Chancellor an
order compelling the mortgagor to pay off the full balance of the debt by a
certain date or be forever barred thereafter from redemption.27
Strict foreclosure was a harsh consequence for a mortgagor that had
accumulated significant equity in the mortgaged land but lacked either the
cash to pay off the debt or the credit needed to refinance that debt. As
mortgagors suffered such losses due to strict foreclosure, many American
states began to adopt judicial foreclosure procedures under which the
mortgagee had to sell the mortgaged land and apply the sale proceeds to pay
off the debt.28 In this way, the foreclosure sale became the predominant
feature of mortgage enforcement under American law.29 While a few states
retain the availability of strict foreclosure, 30 American mortgage law nearly
universally requires that a foreclosure occur through a public auction sale of
the mortgaged land."
Today, every jurisdiction allows the mortgagee to effect a foreclosure
sale through judicial process. 32  As Professors Grant Nelson and Dale
Whitman explain, judicial foreclosure typically involves the following steps:
[A] preliminary title search to determine all parties in interest; filing
of the foreclosure bill of complaint and lis pendens notice; service
of process; a hearing . . ; the decree or judgment; notice of sale;
actual sale and issuance of certificate of sale; report of the sale;
proceedings for determination of the right to any surplus; possible
25. 5 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 331 (1956); 6 SIR WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 663-64 (1956).
26. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 25, at 331-32.
27. Id.; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 1.3, at 8.
28. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 450 (3d ed.
2007).
29. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 1.4, at 9.
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-15 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4528 (2008). Courts have
also recognized strict foreclosure in limited other circumstances, discussed in NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 20, §§ 7.10, 7.15. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) permits strict foreclosure of a
security interest in certain personal property collateral, although it also permits the owner of the
collateral to compel the secured party to foreclose by sale. U.C.C. §§ 9-620 to 9-622 (2000);
WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, WILLIAM H. HENNING & R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, UNDERSTANDING
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 455-58 (4th ed. 2007).
31. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 1.4, at 10.
32. Id.§7.11,at806.
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redemptions from foreclosure sale; and the entry of a decree for a
deficiency.
Proper compliance with these steps provides finality in two important
respects. First, it assures that foreclosure will bind all persons whose
interests need to be extinguished (i.e., the holders of subordinate
encumbrances) so that the foreclosure sale buyer can receive title of the
same quality that existed on the date that the mortgagor granted the
mortgage being foreclosed.34 Second, it reduces doubt about the validity of
the sale itself, as the predicate findings (e.g., the validity of the mortgage,
the existence of a default, the mortgagee's right to foreclose) are established
by the court only after the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to
present relevant evidence.
Nevertheless, this certainty comes at a cost. Judicial foreclosure
requires the mortgagee to incur filing fees, service of process costs, and the
customary professional expenses (e.g., attorney fees) associated with
litigation. Furthermore, judicial foreclosure can take significant time, both
due to mandatory rules of civil procedure (e.g., required time periods for
response to pleadings and/or conduct of discovery) and due to delay
occasioned by docket congestion. The more quickly the mortgagee can
conduct a sale and obtain the sale proceeds, the more quickly the mortgagee
can invest them by making a loan to a creditworthy borrower. By contrast,
the longer judicial foreclosure takes, the greater the mortgagee's lost
opportunity cost. Although interest may continue to accrue on the mortgage
debt during the delay, the mortgagor is unlikely (absent redemption) to pay
that interest once the foreclosure process begins. Further, if the foreclosure
sale price is insufficient to pay off the full balance of the debt, the borrower
may be unable to satisfy the deficiency-or, in jurisdictions with anti-
deficiency protections, may have no legal obligation to do so. Thus, the
longer the foreclosure process, the greater the risk that the mortgagee will
bear costs that go uncompensated by the mortgaged land, the mortgagor, or
both.
While judicial foreclosure is available in all states, thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia permit foreclosure to occur by a public sale
conducted without any judicial process, as long as the mortgage instrument
contains a power of sale so authorizing.36  Likewise, federal statutes
33. Id § 7.11, at 807-08.
34. Id. § 7.12, at 808-09.
35. Id § 7.18, at 843-45.
36. ALA. CODE §§ 35-10-1 (LexisNexis 1991) (mortgages executed prior to Jan. 1, 1989), 35-
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authorize power of sale foreclosure of certain residential mortgages held by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, even in states without
statutes otherwise authorizing power of sale foreclosure. The process by
which power of sale foreclosure occurs varies from state to state in
significant ways, 38 but some generalization is possible. Generally, the
mortgagee need not file any judicial proceeding, or obtain a court order
10-12 (mortgages executed after Dec. 31, 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070 (2006) (deeds of trust
only); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-807 (2009) (deeds of trust only); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-50-101
to -117 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924 to 29241 (Deering 2005); D.C. CODE § 42-815(b) (1981);
GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-114 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-5 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§
45-1505 to -1511 (2003) (deeds of trust only); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6203-A (2003) (only
where premises held for "business, commercial, or agricultural purpose"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 244, § 14 (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3201-3285 (West 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 580.01-30 (West 2000); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1-55, 89-1-57, 89-1-63 (West 2000);
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 443.290 (2000) (mortgages), 443.410 (deeds of trust); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-
1-223 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1005 to -1017 (2003) (deeds of trust only); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 107.080-100 (2000) (deeds of trust only); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:25 (2001); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 48-10-1 to -21 (LexisNexis 1978 and Supp. 2007) (deeds of trust); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46 §§ 40-49 (West 1996) (mortgagor of homestead may compel judicial foreclosure); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.735-795 (West 1989) (deeds of trust only); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-27-4
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-48-1 to -26 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -116
(2007); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-1-23 to -43
(2004) (deeds of trust only); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59.1 to -66.6 (2009) (deeds of trust only); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 453 1(a)-4352 (2009) (does not apply to farmland or dwelling house of two
units or less that is occupied as the owner's principal residence); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
61.24.020 (2009) (deeds of trust only); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-1-3 to -15 (LexisNexis 1966)
(deeds of trust only); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-4-101 to -113 (1977). Power of sale foreclosure is
also permissible in three additional states, but only in conjunction with some minimal judicial or
quasi-judicial process short of a judgment. In North Carolina, a foreclosing lender must institute a
quasi-judicial hearing before the clerk of the superior court in the county where the land is located,
and the clerk must enter an order authorizing the foreclosure sale. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16
(2007). However, this hearing is frequently conducted on an ex parte basis, without prior notice to
the mortgagor. In Colorado, power of sale foreclosure is conducted by an official known as the
Public Trustee, who must obtain a court order authorizing the sale. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-
37-140 (West 2009). In Maryland, a foreclosure sale may occur under power of sale without a final
judgment, but the filing of an action to foreclose is still a precondition to the conduct of the sale.
MD. CODE. ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1 (West 2009).
37. Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (1981); Single Family
Mortgage Foreclosure Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-3768 (1994).
38. Efforts to achieve uniformity in state laws of foreclosure have not met with success. The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) included a power-of-
sale foreclosure procedure in both the Uniform Land Transactions Act (1975) and the Uniform Land
Security Interest Act (1985), but neither was adopted in any state. Gerald Korngold, Legal and
Policy Choices in the Aftermath ofthe Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S. CAR. L. REV.
727, 736-37 (2009). More recently in 2002, NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act (UNFA), but it likewise has not been adopted in any state. Prentiss Cox,
Foreclosure Reform and Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
683, 743 n.373 (2008). This lack of success has prompted Professors Nelson and Whitman to call
for Congress to adopt the UNFA as federal law under its power to regulate interstate commerce.
Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Act, 53 DuKE L.J. 1399, 1509 (2004).
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authorizing the sale.39 Before conducting a sale, the mortgagee must give
prior notice of the sale, typically by mail or personal service, to all persons
designated by the statute as entitled to notice. 40 Finally, before conducting a
sale, the mortgagee must advertise the sale in the manner specified by the
authorizing statute.41
If the mortgagor has not redeemed the land prior to the sale, the
mortgagee conducts the sale at the time and place specified in the pre-sale
notice (typically, at the county courthouse), applies the sale proceeds to
reduce the mortgage debt, and distributes any surplus to the mortgagor or
any junior lienholders entitled to the surplus.42 The sale becomes final
without confirmation or supervision by a court (absent successful collateral
attack by the mortgagor or a junior lienholder based upon defects in the
conduct of the sale).43
For the mortgagee, the primary benefit of power of sale foreclosure is
speed. In states that authorize power of sale foreclosure, a mortgagee can
complete a foreclosure sale in as little as thirty to forty-five days." Because
judicial foreclosure can take substantially longer, power of sale foreclosure
(where available) permits the mortgagee to minimize the lost opportunity
39. See supra note 36.
40. There is substantial state-to-state variation in the persons entitled to pre-sale notice. Most
jurisdictions require that the mortgagee provide pre-sale notice to the owner of the mortgaged land.
Some require that the mortgagee provide notice to any persons holding a subordinate lien on the
land; others require notice to any persons who had recorded a timely request for pre-sale foreclosure
notice. Yet others are silent and thus do not appear to require the mortgagee to provide any notice to
subordinate lienholders (although many foreclosing mortgagees, by custom, will provide pre-sale
notice to any subordinate lienholders of whom they are aware). For a more thorough discussion of
these variations, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.19, at 846-47.
41. The term "advertise" is charitably misleading; in most states, statutes require only the
publication of a specified number of legal notices in classified advertisements in newspapers of
general circulation in the county where the mortgaged land is located. These legal notices often
describe the land only by a legal description rather than by a street address and contain no
information about the characteristics of any improvements on the land. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §
443.320 (2000) (notice shall contain recording information for mortgage, name of mortgagor, time,
terms and place of sale, and description of land; notice shall appear at least twenty times, including
date of sale, in a daily newspaper; for smaller counties without a daily paper, notice shall appear in
some county newspaper once per week for at least four consecutive weeks).
42. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.31, at 920-21.
43. Id. § 7.19, at 845-86.
44. The thirty to forty-five day period is not representative of all states that authorize power of
sale foreclosure. In some states, a longer waiting period is required prior to the conduct of the sale.
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-807(D) (2009) (ninety days); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-103(5)
(2004) (sixty days). In most power of sale foreclosure states, however, anecdotal evidence indicates
that a mortgagee could complete a power of sale foreclosure in less time than a judicial foreclosure.
See FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST (Sidney A. Keyles, ed.,
1995).
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cost associated with the longer recovery period attendant to judicial
foreclosure.45
There is a trade-off for the mortgagee, however-the title produced by a
power of sale foreclosure may be less certain or "final" than the title
produced by a judicial foreclosure sale.46 A judicial foreclosure sale
unquestionably extinguishes all interests junior to the foreclosed mortgage,
as long as the mortgagee joined the holders of those interests as defendants
to the foreclosure proceeding.47 Because principles of preclusion are
relatively clear, a judicial foreclosure sale rarely receives collateral attack
(i.e., a post-sale judicial challenge to the sale's validity) where the
mortgagee joined all necessary parties.48 By contrast, a power of sale
foreclosure involves no judicial determination of issues such as the validity
or balance of the debt, the existence of a default, the mortgagee's right to
foreclose, or the sale's compliance with the state's power of sale foreclosure
statute.49 As a result, the title obtained at a power of sale foreclosure is more
likely to be collaterally attacked by the mortgagor or the holder of a junior
interest in the mortgaged land.o
There are two basic types of collateral attacks on power of sale
foreclosure titles. The first is a constitutional challenge to power of sale
foreclosure as a denial of due process to the borrower, the holders of junior
interests in the mortgaged land, or both.51 For the most part, courts have
rejected these challenges, frequently concluding that power of sale
foreclosure does not involve state action subject to due process
requirements.52 The second, and more common, type of collateral attack
involves a statutory challenge to the validity of the sale based upon the
absence of a default, an inadequate sale price, the mortgagee's
noncompliance with the power of sale foreclosure statute, or a combination
thereof. A sale conducted in the absence of a default is void, as the
mortgagee lacks any authority to conduct a sale in those circumstances.53
While an inadequate sale price by itself usually does not invalidate a sale, it
typically prompts the court to search for evidence of the mortgagee's
45. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.19, at 848.
46. Id. § 7.19, at 848-49.
47. Id § 7.12, at 808-09.
48. Id. §7.19, at 849.
49. Id. § 7.19, at 846.
50. Id. § 7.19, at 849.
51. Id. §§ 7.23-30, at 889-920.
52. Pappas v. E. Say. Bank, 911 A.2d 1230 (D.C. 2006); Cheff v. Edwards, 513 N.W.2d 439
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994); AgriBank FCB v. Cross Timbers Ranch, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996); see also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.27, at 904 n.2 (collecting cases that reflect
a trend against finding state action). Whether power of sale foreclosure statutes implicate
constitutional concerns is beyond the intended scope of this article.
53. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.20, at 849-50.
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noncompliance with the foreclosure statute,54 and courts finding such
evidence of noncompliance have often allowed the mortgagor or a junior
encumbrancer to set aside such sales.55
If a foreclosure sale bidder cannot eliminate the risk of collateral attack,
the bidder will presumably respond by discounting the bid to account for
that risk. If the goal of the foreclosure process is to produce a sale price that
reflects the value of the mortgaged land (if not enough to satisfy the debt
entirely), the uncertainty associated with the risk of collateral attack
potentially reduces the efficacy of power of sale foreclosure. For this
reason, statutes authorizing power of sale foreclosure attempt to minimize
this risk by providing enhanced finality rules. For example, statutes in
some states provide that if the foreclosure sale deed recites that the
mortgagee complied with all statutory requirements, the recitals constitute
conclusive evidence of the mortgagee's compliance in favor of a good faith
purchaser of the land for value."
Though power of sale foreclosure is available in more than thirty
jurisdictions," there remain a significant number of states in which
foreclosure cannot occur without judicial process. 9 In five such states-
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, and South Carolina-there is an
affirmative statutory mandate that foreclosure must occur through judicial
action.60  In ten other states-Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin-
foreclosure occurs by judicial process (even without an affirmative statutory
54. Id § 7.21, at 853-76 (chronicling specific problems with power of sale foreclosures).
55. Id. § 7.22, at 880-82.
56. Id. § 7.21, at 873-76.
57. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-811 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-111 (2004); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 71-1-318 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-28 (2004).
58. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.19, at 845 n.1.
59. Id§7.11,at806n.1.
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.01 (West 1994) ("All mortgages shall be foreclosed in equity."); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1405 (West 2003) ("No real estate within this State may be sold by
virtue of any power of sale contained in a mortgage or any other agreement. . . ."); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 654.1 (West 1995) ("[A] deed of trust or mortgage of real estate shall not be foreclosed in
any other manner than by action in court by equitable proceedings."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
426.525 (1992) ("[Private] foreclosure of a mortgage is forbidden. . . ."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-
630 (1976) ("No sale under or by virtue of any mortgage or other instrument in writing intended as
security for a debt, conferring a power upon the mortgagee or creditor to sell the mortgaged or
pledged property . .. shall be valid to pass the title of the land mortgaged unless the debt for which
the security is given shall be first established by the judgment of some court of competent
jurisdiction or unless the amount of the debt be consented to in writing by the debtor subsequently to
the maturity of the debt. . . .").
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mandate) due to the lack of any express statutory authority for power of sale
foreclosure.
II. ARBITRATION AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS AND VALUES
Arbitration is the private adjudication of legal disputes before a neutral
decision maker whose final determination, or "award," is binding upon the
parties.61 By its nature, arbitration depends upon the consent of the parties
to the dispute. Once a dispute arises, parties can agree to submit the dispute
to an arbitrator rather than to the public courts.62 More commonly, however,
disputes come to arbitration by virtue of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in contracts, which require the parties to submit the entire dispute (or
perhaps specific issues) to arbitration.
In some key respects, arbitration is akin to litigation.64 Like litigation, it
is by nature an adversarial process designed to generate information that the
decision maker will use to evaluate the merits of the dispute and reach an
appropriate determination:
Most arbitrations involve a hearing in which attorneys may
represent the parties; witnesses are sworn, examined and cross-
examined; and exhibits are entered into evidence. In many cases,
parties request a transcript of the proceedings and file post-hearing
briefs. After all of the evidence and briefs (if filed) are in, the
arbitrator will issue a decision.
61. 1 THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:2, at 1-9 (3d ed. 2003); LEONARD
L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 506-07 (3d ed. 2005). The statement in the
text is somewhat overbroad, as there exist some forms of nonbinding nonjudicial dispute resolution
techniques that are sometimes called "nonbinding arbitration," such as the "mini-trial." See
OEHMKE, supra, § 1:4, at 1-15 ("The mini-trial is a structured settlement procedure providing for a
confidential, nonbinding exchange of information to facilitate dialogue between the parties on the
merits."). Courts have not reached consensus on whether these nonbinding mechanisms constitute
"arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA. Compare Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d
1205 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that a dispute resolution procedure established by franchise agreement
requiring submission of disputes to arbitration qualified as "arbitration" governed by FAA, even
though award was nonbinding), with Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 373 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the ICANN dispute resolution procedure for domain name registration disputes is not
"arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA because the FAA applies only to "binding proceedings
likely to 'realistically settle the dispute'). As discussed in Part I, because title clearance is a
fundamental attribute of an effective foreclosure process, an arbitration procedure governing
foreclosure would serve little purpose unless it was mandatory and binding. Accordingly, this article
will use the term "arbitration" to describe a private adjudication that is both mandatory and binding.
62. RISKIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 507.
63. Id. at 507; see also I LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:2
(3d ed. 2009).
64. RISKIN ETAL.,supra note 61, at 511.
65. Id. at 511. The statement in the text is certainly an over-generalization; arbitration processes
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Nevertheless, arbitration is not identical to public adjudication.6 To
provide a framework for evaluating the merits of litigation and arbitration as
potential means of accomplishing foreclosure of a mortgage, Part II
compares and contrasts the structure ("process characteristics") of public
adjudication and arbitration,67 thus highlighting some of the objectives
("process values") that one or both parties68 might seek to capture through
the use of arbitration. In describing these process characteristics and
process values, Part II also explores their relevance to the potential utility of
arbitration as a substitute for judicial foreclosure.70
A. The Process Characteristics ofArbitration
1. Informality and Flexibility of Process
Public adjudication is ostensibly characterized by strict adherence to the
rules of evidence and civil procedure (including discovery rules).7  In
contrast, pleadings, discovery, and presentation of evidence by the parties to
will vary considerably depending upon the context. For example, just as debt-collection litigation
frequently involves default judgments without trial, debt-collection arbitration might proceed
without any appearance by the debtor or any hearing before the arbitrator, particularly if the debtor
has no defense to payment of the debt.
66. Id.
67. See infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text. The textual description of arbitration is by
necessity an overgeneralization. The arbitration process will vary greatly depending upon context.
68. In many contexts-perhaps most-mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses are not the
product of active negotiation between the parties over their ideal dispute resolution structure.
Instead, a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause is often adhesive in nature, insisted upon by one
party to the contract on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. See Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637
(1996). By itself, this observation does not inherently call into question the legitimacy of such a
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause. One might still characterize such a clause as the product of
"consent," particularly if the "consenting" party believed that the overall gains available from the
transaction justified acceptance of the arbitration clause. See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for
Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and
Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 252-53 (2006). Whether mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses should be enforced, and in what contexts (particularly in consumer transactions) is an
important normative question. However, this article does not directly address that question and is
not meant to resolve it.
69. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. I have borrowed the labels "process
characteristics" and "process values" from the work of my colleague Richard Reuben. Reuben,
supra note 8, at 278.
70. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
71. See Reuben, supra note 8, at 278.
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an arbitration are governed by rules established by the parties themselves.7 2
Commonly, these rules are established when the parties contract to
incorporate arbitration rules promulgated by arbitration service providers
such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS). However, arbitration also
permits the parties to customize the adjudication process to their own
specific needs." Thus, the parties could design their own expedited
timetable and rules for the preparation and filing of pleadings, the exchange
of relevant information, and the conduct of the hearing. In this regard, as
compared to the ordinary rules of civil pleading and procedure, arbitration
can give parties the flexibility to establish a process more appropriately
tailored to the nature and complexity of their dispute or to their own
commercial exigencies.
2. Identity of the Decision Maker
In public adjudication, the parties are assigned a judge who may or may
not be familiar with the issues and legal background presented by a74particular transaction. By contrast, the parties to an arbitration are free to
choose their own arbitrator.7 ' Theoretically, this enables the parties to select
a decision maker ideally suited to resolve their particular dispute-whether
because of her expertise with respect to the type of transaction, her past
experience in arbitrating similar disputes, her reputation or stature within the
community, or any combination of the above.
3. The Rule and Form of Decision
In public adjudication, a judge is expected to adhere to the rule of law
and use the existing rule of law within the applicable jurisdiction as the basis
of her decision. If a judge fails to do so, she likely will be reversed if the
72. RISKIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 511 ("Generalizing about the arbitration process is difficult
because the parties [themselves] have the autonomy to design their arbitration system."); Stephen
Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for
Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 343, 367 (1995) (noting the "comparative simplicity" of
pleading and pre-hearing stages of commercial arbitration as compared to the more extensive
pleading and pre-hearing motion practice typical of litigation).
73. EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 4 (2006) ("Under a contractual approach
the parties exercise their will by covenanting for specific arbitration procedures rather than merely
opting for an undefined agreement to arbitrate, which will leave much of the choice of the arbitration
procedure to the arbitrator or organization selected to administer the arbitration process.").
74. Reuben, supra note 8, at 280.
75. RISKINETAL., supra note 61, at 510.
76. Reuben, supra note 8, at 280; see also BRUNET, supra note 73, § 1.3, at 12-15 (addressing
the existence and potential/perceived benefit of arbitrator expertise).
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losing party appeals. Further, a judge typically provides an opinion that
explains her decision; theoretically, this facilitates both accuracy in decision
making (i.e., a judge forced to justify her conclusion will be more likely to
reason carefully and thus reach the correct conclusion) and judicial
accountability (i.e., poor opinions are more likely to be reversed on appeal or
subjected to public criticism, in turn prompting judges to exercise greater
care). By contrast, absent a contrary agreement of the parties, an arbitrator
need not apply the law in resolving the dispute and may instead base her
award upon broad principles of equity and justice or industry standards and
practices. 77  Further, an arbitrator need not provide formal opinions
explaining or justifying her decision (again, absent contrary agreement by
the parties). This flexibility permits the parties to designate rules of
decision more appropriate to the context of their particular transaction and
can produce decision making efficiency (i.e., an arbitrator can render a
decision more quickly and at a lower cost if she need not devote the time
necessary to produce a reasoned opinion).
The preceding paragraph suggests a difference between litigation and
arbitration that is in some contexts more theoretical than real. Parties can,
and frequently do, specify in their agreement that the arbitrator shall decide
the dispute in accordance with existing legal rules.79 In fact, arbitrators may
market themselves as prospective decision makers by touting their expertise
and familiarity with existing legal rules.so Furthermore, it is customary in
many contexts (such as labor-management arbitration and international
77. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 127 (1992) (arbitrators in disputes involving diamond
merchants resolved disputes based upon "custom and usage, a little common sense, some Jewish
law, and, last, common-law legal principles"); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory
Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 726-27 (1999) ("[An arbitration
agreement] contracts out of all the law that would have been applied by a court but for the
agreement. All such law, in effect, consists of default rules because arbitration agreements are
enforced. Arbitration agreements contract out of substantive law; they privatize law.").
78. Richard Reuben suggests that the traditional reluctance of arbitrators to provide written and
reasoned opinions stems from a concern that a reasoned opinion would be more susceptible to the
threat ofjudicial review, thereby "undermining the goal of finality." Reuben, supra note 8, at 281.
79. BRUNET, supra note 73, § 3.4, at 74 (2006) ("The popularity of choice-of-law clauses is
unquestioned. These clauses help to achieve simplicity in an overly complex legal and business
world by restricting the number of potentially applicable laws and thereby reducing the transaction
costs of negotiating and contracting.").
80. Reuben, supra note 8, at 280 n.49 (noting that the National Arbitration Forum's marketing
information emphasizes that its arbitrators "review the facts and render decisions based on known
rules and substantive law").
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commercial arbitration) for arbitrators to include a reasoned decision
accompanying the award.
4. Enforceability of Award/Decision
Enforceability is a key similarity between public adjudication and
arbitration. If the parties have so agreed, the arbitrator's decision is fully
binding on the parties, 82 even if the award has not been judicially
confirmed. If the party against whom an arbitration award is made fails to
satisfy that award, the other party may enforce that award in the public
courts.84 This feature is critical to the effectiveness of arbitration as a
dispute resolution mechanism: if the arbitrator's decision is merely advisory(nonbinding), the party against whom an arbitration award was entered could
simply choose to ignore it.85
5. Finality of Award/Decision
Public adjudication generally offers the losing litigant the opportunity,
as a matter of right, to appellate review of an adverse judgment. While some
deference is due the trial judge as to questions of fact-an appellate court
may reject findings of fact only if those findings are clearly erroneous 86 - O
such deference is due to the trial court's conclusions of law, which the
appellate court may evaluate de novo. By contrast, an arbitration award is,for the most part, substantively unreviewable." For arbitrations governed by
the FAA, a court may vacate the arbitrator's award only if "the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue [influence]"; the arbitrator was
evidently partial, corrupt, or both; the arbitrator was guilty of certain
prejudicial misconduct in conducting the arbitration; or the arbitrator
81. RISKINETAL., supra note 61, at 511.
82. Id. at 507.
83. EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 41:3, at 41-2 to 41-3 ("[An] award which is not confirmed by ajudgment in the usual summary procedure may nevertheless serve as a cause of action, to be
enforced in ordinary court procedure, as an action on the award."); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1287.6(West 2009) ("An award that has not been confirmed or vacated has the same force and effect as a
contract in writing between the parties to the arbitration."). In the context of foreclosure, the
enforceability of the award without confirmation has some practical significance in terms of
efficiency. For example, if the mortgagor has relinquished possession of the land voluntarily, the
foreclosure sale buyer at a foreclosure-by-arbitration could take possession of the land without the
need to judicially confirm the award. Moreover, even if the mortgagor has not relinquished
possession of the land, the foreclosure sale buyer could bring an action to obtain possession of the
land based on the unconfirmed award. In other words, the foreclosure sale buyer would not have to
go to the additional expense of confirming the award just to obtain possession of the land.
84. EDMONSON, supra note 63, §§ 42.2, 42.3.
85. Reuben, supra note 8, at 282.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
87. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
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exceeded his powers or the award fails to reach a final and binding
resolution upon a matter submitted to arbitration."
Likewise, the FAA authorizes the judicial modification or correction of
an arbitration award only under limited circumstances, typically involving
either an evident arithmetical or descriptive error or an award that exceeds
the scope of the matter submitted to arbitration. 89 The Supreme Court has
recently held that these statutory grounds are exclusive and not merely
threshold provisions open to expansion by agreement. 90 In addition, courts
typically permit vacatur of arbitration awards on nonstatutory grounds only
where the party attacking the award can demonstrate that the award reflects
"'manifest disregard' of the law"9' or is "void as against public policy."92
Vacatur of commercial arbitration awards on these nonstatutory grounds
appears to be relatively rare, though it is perhaps increasing.93
88. Id.
89. Id. § I1(a), (b). Modification is also possible "where the award is imperfect in matter of
form not affecting the merits of the controversy." Id. § I1(c).
90. In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., the parties' pre-dispute arbitration clause provided
that the federal district court "shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions
of law are erroneous." 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1400-01 (2008). The Court reversed the district court's
vacatur of an award based upon the arbitrator's erroneous conclusion of law, rejecting the
petitioner's argument that the clause expanded the permissible grounds for vacatur. Id. at 1405 ("On
application for an order confirming the arbitration award, the court 'must grant' the order 'unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and II of this title.' There is
nothing malleable about 'must grant,' which unequivocally tells courts to grant confirmation in all
cases, except when one of the 'prescribed' exceptions applies. This does not sound remotely like a
provision meant to tell a court what to do just in case the parties say nothing else.").
91. Ware, supra note 77, at 724.
92. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Ware, supra
note 77, at 724.
93. Writing in a 1996 article, Professor Steven Hayford noted that based upon a review of circuit
court cases, "no commercial arbitration award has been vacated" based upon the "'manifest
disregard' of the law" standard. Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for
Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 776 (1996). A recent article by
Professor Michael LeRoy, however, suggests that some (though not all) courts have become more
receptive to vacatur based upon manifest disregard. Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create Moral
Hazard? When Judges Nullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REv. 998, 1031-32
(2009). Compare, DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(vacating panel's denial of attorney fees because the arbitrators "appreciate[d] the existence of a
clearly governing legal principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it" (quoting DiRussa
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d. Cir. 1997))), and Halligan v. Piper Jaffray,
Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating award that denied employee's age discrimination
claim, based on manifest disregard, where evidence reflected that the parties agreed on the governing
law and had explained it to the arbitrator), with Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d
704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (expressing doubts about "manifest disregard" standard, saying "[wle can
understand neither the need for the formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration
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While the finality of an arbitration award means that an arbitrator's
errors may not be readily corrected, this characteristic permits the parties to
achieve efficiency in the resolution of disputes.94 As the Supreme Court has
noted, parties that choose binding arbitration "trade[] the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and
expedition of arbitration." 95
6. Privacy
Public adjudication occurs within the public sphere. Unless a court
issues a protective order that prevents public access to the pleadings and
evidence presented by the parties, judicial resolution of disputes occurs
subject to public scrutiny. By contrast, an arbitration hearing typically
occurs in private.96 The parties to an arbitration may agree that the pleadings
and evidence presented to the arbitrator are private matters that neither the
parties nor the arbitrator may disclose to third parties. Such an agreement
can even include the identity of the parties to an arbitration and the fact that
the dispute is being arbitrated. 97 Thus, if one party believes public access to
a hearing or decision carries the threat of commercial disadvantage or
embarrassment, that party may prefer arbitration to public adjudication.
B. The Process Values of Commercial Arbitration
The foregoing process characteristics of arbitration enable commercial
actors to use arbitration agreements as a means to obtain certain desired
objectives (or "process values"). For example, some have argued that
arbitration may help to preserve existing business relationships99 and that its
(we suspect none-that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the
back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modem law of arbitration.").
94. Ware, supra note 77, at 723 ("The standard policy rationale for judicial deference to
arbitration awards ... is that arbitration should be a substitute for litigation, not a prelude to
litigation.").
95. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
96. RISKIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 506.
97. BRUNET, supra note 73, § 1.2, at 8 ("The desire for secrecy can be a prime determinant in
selecting arbitration. Often one or more party to an arbitration agreement has an interest in avoiding
a public trial with unwanted adverse publicity.... The last thing a restaurant chain or a bank needs
is a public airing of dirty linen involving allegations of discrimination. In this context, secrecy in
disputing may be the primary reason that a business seeks arbitration.").
98. Reuben, supra note 8, at 283; Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the
Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1255, 1277-78 (2006).
99. EDMSONSON, supra note 63, § 1:5, at 1-16 ("[T~he arbitration process can often be valuable
because it may help to preserve an ongoing relationship between the parties."); DAVID B. LIPSKY &
RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE
GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 17 (1998) (noting that 41.3% of survey respondents
indicated preservation of good relationships as a reason for using arbitration).
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structure and informality relative to litigation may foster greater civility
among disputants.'00 As noted above, the structure of arbitration can foster a
party's desire for secrecy, whether for purposes of protection from
competitors or avoidance of personal embarrassment.'o The most dominant
objectives, however-and those most relevant to whether arbitration might
provide an effective substitute for judicial foreclosure-are efficiency and
autonomy.
1. Efficiency
The most evident objective sought by parties in choosing arbitration is
efficiency. 102 Parties can use arbitration to circumvent long delays attendant
to docket congestion in public courts, and they may adopt their own
timetable for pleadings and the exchange of relevant information (rather than
the potentially longer timetables applicable to civil pleading and discovery).
The finality of an arbitral award permits its immediate enforcement without
the potential delay occasioned by an appeal. By allowing the parties to
select their own decision maker, procedural rules and timetables, and
substantive rules of decision, and by according finality to the award,
arbitration ostensibly permits parties to create a dispute resolution process
that can produce a final result much more rapidly than public adjudication.o 3
Theoretically, this permits parties to create a process that can resolve
disputes at a lower overall cost than judicial adjudication.'0
100. Reuben, supra note 8, at 283.
101. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
102. BRUNET, supra note 73, § 1.5, at 17 ("Efficiency represents one of the perceived core tenets
of arbitration. Much of arbitration's popularity rests on a reputation of delivering efficient, low
transaction costs results when compared to the excesses of the litigation system.").
103. See LIPSKY, supra note 99, at 17 (noting that 68.5% of survey respondents indicated time
savings as a reason for using arbitration).
104. See id. (stating that 68.6% of survey respondents indicated savings of money as a reason for
using arbitration). Obviously, whether arbitration actually delivers substantial efficiencies over
litigation is an empirical question, and the data is mixed. Compare Thomas Stipanowich, Rethinking
American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 472 (1988) (claims of arbitration speed and efficiency are
well-founded, especially in small cases), with BRUNET, supra note 73, § 1.5, at 18 ("The case for
efficiency as a paramount value underlying arbitration is tepid at best. .. . [T]here is little empirical
evidence that the arbitration system guarantees a more efficient outcome than trial, and emerging
evidence suggests that trials can be as efficient as arbitration.").
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2. Autonomy
In theory, the enforceability of arbitration agreements should provide
persons with substantial autonomy in deciding how to resolve disputes. In
fact, as Professor Stephen Ware has argued, one might view autonomy as the
dominant process value of arbitration:
I do not see secrecy, arbitrator expertise, adjudication efficiency or
finality as necessary values of arbitration. I see autonomy as the
value that transcends these other values. Because arbitration law
gives the parties autonomy, they can choose to have their arbitration
be secret or not. Because arbitration law gives the parties
autonomy, they can choose to have their arbitrator be an expert or
not. Because arbitration law gives the parties autonomy, they can
choose to have their arbitration use quick and efficient procedures
or not. Because arbitration law gives the parties autonomy, they can
choose to make their arbitration final or-by having an appellate
arbitration panel or expanding the grounds for vacatur-not.
It is certainly true that most parties to arbitration agreements
choose to use their autonomy to advance the values of secrecy,
arbitrator expertise, adjudication efficiency, and finality. But, in my
view, that does not show that these are core values of arbitration; it
shows that these are core values of most of the parties who agree to
arbitrate. If the values of those people changed, arbitration would
change accordingly; but it would do so because of its core value,
autonomy, not because it was abandoning other core values.'os
By allowing parties to choose private adjudication, the identity of the
adjudicator, and the procedures and substantive rules to govern the
adjudication, arbitration thus empowers persons to resolve their own
disputes through a self-defined process in a way that public adjudication
cannot.106  As Professor Edward Brunet has noted, the availability of
arbitration thus reinforces the "freedom essential in a democratic state.7
105. BRUNET, supra note 73, at 339.
106. Certainly, this argument finesses the question of whether parties to mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses are really equally autonomous actors who are readily "agreeing" to arbitration,
particularly in the context of consumer transactions. Again, this article does not (and is not meant
to) take a normative position on the fairness of mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration. This
article is meant only to explore whether a mortgagee legally could accomplish the objectives of a
mortgage foreclosure through arbitration, and, if so, why pre-dispute foreclosure-by-arbitration
agreements have not become customary.
107. BRUNET, supra note 73, § 1.1, at 4-5 (2006) ("In a democratic society, party autonomy
should be the fundamental value that shapes arbitration. The personal autonomy inherent in
arbitration constitutes a dominant policy in all areas of a democracy. The freedom to select
arbitration procedure is a choice that one anticipates should exist in a state that values personal
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In this way, arbitration could produce greater disputant satisfaction-if not
with the result, at least with the process by which it was reached.os
C. Arbitration and the Objectives of the Foreclosure Process
Where permitted, power of sale foreclosure shares many (although not
all) of the same process characteristics and values as arbitration. As
discussed in Part I, power of sale foreclosure provides for a streamlined
procedure for the sale of mortgaged realty without the filing of a complaint
or judicial supervision.109 Where it is available, a lender can complete a
power of sale foreclosure much more quickly than it could complete a
judicial foreclosure of the same property, potentially achieving substantial
efficiencies." 0 Furthermore, without judicial supervision, the details of the
dispute are not a matter of public record."' Thus, in states that permit power
of sale foreclosure, a mortgage lender has no real incentive to contract for
and use an arbitration process for foreclosure.
In states that require judicial foreclosure, however, mortgagees appear to
have substantial incentives to create and use a contractual arbitration process
for foreclosure. While judicial foreclosure in many states takes se !en
months or longer,1 2 an arbitration agreement could establish an expedited
procedure that would enable foreclosure to be completed on a timetable
much closer to that prevailing in power of sale foreclosure states. Further,
autonomy."); see also Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of
Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 303 (2004).
108. LIPSKY, supra note 99, at 18-19 (in responding to a survey asking why companies use
arbitration, 49.9% of survey respondents indicated the ability to use the arbitrator's expertise; 34.8%
indicated "more satisfactory settlements"; 60.5% indicated "more satisfactory process"); RISKIN ET
AL., supra note 61.
109. See supra note 36.
110. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
111. Nothing prevents a mortgagor from instituting a civil action seeking an injunction against a
power of sale foreclosure, either because the mortgagee is not entitled to foreclose (e.g., because the
loan is not in default or because the mortgagee has waived a default) or because there is a substantial
defect in the mortgagee's compliance with the power of sale foreclosure statute (e.g., failure of the
mortgagee to publish the required sale notices, scheduling of the sale at a time not permitted by the
statute, or collusion between the mortgagee and potential bidders). At that point, public litigation
will be necessary to resolve questions about the existence of a default, the mortgagee's right to
foreclose, and the mortgagee's compliance with the statutory process governing power of sale
foreclosure.
112. When the then-Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the ABA gathered survey
data in the early 1990s, the time period for an uncontested judicial foreclosure averaged seven
months, and became significantly longer in contested cases or in courts with congested dockets. See
generally FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES, supra note 44.
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because arbitration would occur outside the context of the public courts, the
arbitrator's award would not be a public record, providing the mortgagee
with a measure of privacy not available in litigation."'
III. CAN ARBITRATION LEGALLY SUBSTITUTE FOR JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE?
Despite the increasing use of arbitration clauses in a wide range of
commercial transactions, lenders have not incorporated foreclosure-by-
arbitration clauses into mortgages." 4  As explained earlier, this is
understandable in states where nonjudicial foreclosure provides the
mortgagee with a quick and effective remedy." But why have we not seen
foreclosure-by-arbitration clauses adopted in judicial-foreclosure-only states,
given the efficiencies potentially presented by arbitration as compared to
judicial foreclosure?
The most likely structural explanation for this phenomenon lies in the
influence of secondary market purchasers. Mortgage lenders want to be able
to sell their loans on the secondary market and thus must ensure that their
loan documents comply with the requirements of secondary market
purchasers. To this point, standard mortgage forms do not contain
arbitration clauses at all,"'6 or, if they do, they "carve out" foreclosure from
their scope."'
In consumer mortgages, the absence of pre-dispute arbitration
provisions bears the clear fingerprints of the major secondary market actors
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In December 2003, Freddie Mac announced
that it would not purchase subprime mortgages containing mandatory
arbitration clauses,"'8 and in February 2004, Fannie Mae made a similar
113. This is not to say that a foreclosure by means of arbitration would be entirely "private."
Obviously, because the mortgagee is seeking to sell the mortgaged property in a public sale, the
mortgagee would certainly disclose to buyers that it had obtained an arbitration award finding the
existence of a default and the mortgagee's right to conduct a foreclosure sale. Further, because a
foreclosure will frequently require the joinder of junior interests (e.g., persons whose liens must be
extinguished for a sale to deliver clear title to the purchaser), a mortgagee could not effectively
ensure the complete confidentiality of arbitration proceedings.
114. See Martha Neil, Litigation Over Arbitration: Courts Differ on Enforceability of Mandatory
Clauses, 91 A.B.A.J. 50, 55 (2005).
115. See supra notes 13-14, 36-45 and accompanying text.
116. See Neil, supra note 114, at 54 (stating that "the nation's major purchasers of mortgages,
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, [do] not ... allow mandatory arbitration provisions in mortgages they
buy").
117. 2 MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER & STEVEN W. BENDER, LAW OF REAL ESTATE
FINANCING § 14:32 n.3 (2009) (giving several examples of arbitration clause "carve outs" for
foreclosure).
118. Banking-Mortgages: Freddie Mac Will Not Buy Subprime Loans that Contain Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses, 72 U.S.L.W. 2342 (2003).
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announcement.'1 9  These decisions by Fannie and Freddie reflected
substantial political pressure-brought to bear by a wide range of consumer
and civil rights organizations l20-regarding the perceived unfairness of
mandatory consumer arbitration.121
These fairness concerns carry much less weight, if any, in the
commercial setting, where there has also been an active secondary market
for commercial mortgage-backed securities. However, we have not seen
foreclosure-by-arbitration provisions being incorporated into commercial
mortgage documentation here either.122 But why? One answer is that the
marketability of a mortgage loan is (at least in part) a function of investor
confidence in the legal mechanisms to enforce the terms of the loan
documents after default. In this regard, there has never been any doubt
about the availability and legal effect of judicial foreclosure. By contrast,
arbitration as a substitute for foreclosure has no track record. No court has
ever explicitly held that the entire mortgage foreclosure process can be
privatized through arbitration. Absent explicit statutory or judicial authority,
lawyers for borrowers and lenders might be understandably reluctant to
119. Banking -Mortgages: Fannie Mae Will Not Buy Home Mortgages with Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses, 72 U.S.L.W. 2463 (2004).
120. A December 9, 2003 press conference following Freddie Mac's announcement involved
representatives of the American Association of Retired Persons, Consumer Federation of America,
National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Association of Consumer Advocates,
National Consumer Law Center, Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and Self-Help Credit Union. 72
U.S.L.W. 2342 (2003).
121. These concerns apply more broadly, of course, than just in the context of foreclosure of
consumer mortgages. Professor Jean R. Sternlight has been a vocal and articulate critic of the
fairness of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration and has proposed that "legislation should clearly and
simply proscribe the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration with respect to consumer
transactions." Jean R. Stemlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 73, § 5.7, at 183. By contrast, Professor Stephen Ware has
written articulately in defense of mandatory arbitration in the consumer context (though not
specifically in the context of mortgage foreclosure). Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as
Exceptional Consumer Law, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195, 213 (1998) (arguing that consumers should
have an alienable right "to get consideration for the right to government adjudication"); Stephen J.
Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001
J. DISP. RESOL. 89. The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, still pending in Congress, would
amend the FAA to abolish arbitration pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute agreements in the context
of consumer transactions. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., § 4 (2009). Again, it is not my intention in this
article to address the normative question of whether foreclosure via mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses would be a good thing. Nevertheless, Part IV offers some concluding thoughts on
this normative question. See infra notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
122. See Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Mo. L. REV.
1031, 1034 (2007).
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opine regarding the enforceability of a foreclosure-by-arbitration clause. As
a result, it is not entirely surprising that even in a judicial-foreclosure-only
state, lenders have not chosen to contract for the potential uncertainty of
whether the foreclosure process could be entirely privatized through
arbitration.
As this Part explains, however, there are no structural legal barriers
preventing a mortgage lender from accomplishing foreclosure through
arbitration as a substitute for judicial process. First, if the mortgage
contained a pre-dispute arbitration clause submitting the entire foreclosure
process to arbitration (i.e., the final and binding determination and
supervision of a neutral decision maker) governed by the FAA, FAA § 2 will
preempt contrary state law-such as a state judicial-foreclosure-only
statute-that would limit or condition the enforceability of the clause.123
Second, even though FAA § 2 preserves the possibility of contract defenses
such as unconscionability, a foreclosure-by-arbitration clause could not
properly be viewed as unconscionable (unless it was drafted in such a one-
sided, mortgagee-favorable fashion as to "shock the conscience").124
Finally, even though junior lienholders would not be signatories to the
mortgage containing a foreclosure-by-arbitration clause, that clause is still
legally enforceable against them under existing law governing the
enforcement of covenants against successors. 125 Part III discusses each of
these issues in turn.
A. The Preemptive Effect of FAA § 2
Where a mortgagor and mortgagee agree to a pre-dispute arbitration
provision, the FAA preempts state law that would purport to limit the
enforceability of that agreement. FAA § 2 provides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.126
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed that this language has
preemptive effect.127 As the Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating,128
123. See infra notes 126-79 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 201-87 and accompanying text.
126. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
127. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
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FAA § 2 preempts any contrary state law that restricts the arbitrability of
disputes covered by the FAA or the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate such a dispute.129 The Court reaffirmed this principle in Perry v.
Thomas, in which a brokerage employee sought to litigate a wage collection
dispute with his employer, despite the arbitration requirement of New York
Stock Exchange rules. 30 The employee argued that California Labor Code
section 229 expressly conferred on him a right to bring a wage collection
action despite the existence of a private arbitration agreement.13 ' The Court
rejected this argument, holding that the FAA preempted the California
statute.132 These cases have established that states may not implement an
anti-arbitration law or policy that would frustrate the FAA's purpose of
overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration agreements. 133 The Court has
continued to reaffirm the FAA's preemptive effect, most recently in Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegnal34 and Preston v. Ferrer.'35
128. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
129. In Southland, the Court held that the California Franchise Investment Law, which required
judicial consideration of claims brought under that law, conflicted with § 2 and thus violated the
Supremacy Clause. Id. at 10; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that the FAA
preempted California Labor Code section 229, which authorized action for collection of wages
"without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v.
Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that the FAA preempted a New Jersey law that
required disputes arising under a state franchise protection act to be resolved in New Jersey courts).
130. Perry, 482 U.S. at 486.
13 1. Id.
132. Id. at 491 ("This clear federal policy [of rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements]
places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California's § 229 requirement that litigants be
provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes. Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the
state statute must give way."). One might attempt to distinguish Perry by arguing that the California
statute expressed explicit hostility to arbitration agreements in that it purported to affirm the
employee's right to sue for wage collection despite the existence of a private arbitration agreement.
By contrast, those state statutes mandating judicial foreclosure of a mortgage are simply silent as to
arbitration (i.e., they do not state that a private foreclosure-by-arbitration agreement would be
unenforceable). As a policy matter, however, such a distinction would have to fail, as it would
permit state legislatures to circumvent arbitration agreements simply by adopting statutes that create
a right to sue in court without mentioning the enforceability of a private arbitration agreement.
133. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting the
FAA established "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary."); OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 3:17, at 3-33.
134. 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding an arbitration provision in a "check-into-cash" loan agreement
was enforceable even if the agreement violated Florida usury laws and was void ab initio under
Florida law).
135. 128 S. Ct. 978 (2008) (finding a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in an attorney services
contract enforceable even though California law purported to vest jurisdiction over fee disputes in
the state labor commissioner).
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So if a mortgage contains an agreement to resolve foreclosure through
arbitration governed by the FAA, would § 2 require a court to enforce the
agreement and disregard state law that would otherwise compel foreclosure
through judicial process? When a party raises a challenge to the
enforceability of a contractual provision requiring arbitration governed by
the FAA, there are two threshold questions to be resolved. The first is
whether the transaction in question "involves commerce" within the
meaning of the FAA.136 The second is whether the contract contains an
agreement for "arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA.137 For § 2 to
preempt contrary state laws, both questions must be answered yes, and, as
discussed below, both questions should be answered yes in evaluating
preemption in the context of a foreclosure-by-arbitration clause.
1. Mortgage Transactions "Involve Commerce" Within the Meaning
of the FAA
One might attempt to challenge foreclosure-by-arbitration by arguing
that the granting and enforcement of a mortgage is local activity rather than
activity in interstate commerce, and thus is outside the scope of the FAA.
However, there is no longer any legal doubt that a mortgage transaction is
one "involving commerce" within the meaning of FAA § 2.138
The Supreme Court has held that in exercising power under the
Commerce Clause, Congress need not show any specific effect upon
interstate commerce; instead, it is sufficient that the economic activity in
question "would represent 'a general practice . . . subject to federal
control"" 3 9 or that "bear[s] on interstate commerce in a substantial way." 40
Given the role that real estate mortgage lending and securitization played in
our current national recession, there can be no doubt that real estate
mortgage lending has a substantial (if imprecise) impact upon interstate
commerce.14' Furthermore, in interpreting FAA § 2, the Court has held that
136. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009) (applying to arbitration agreements written in contracts "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" (emphasis added)).
137 Id.
138. See infra notes 139-58 and accompanying text.
139. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57 (2003) (quoting Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
140. Id. at 57 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-197 n.27 (1968) and NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937)).
141. Well before the origination and securitization of subprime mortgages accelerated to record
levels in the early to mid-2000s, Professors Grant Nelson and Bob Pushaw argued that the proper
understanding of the Commerce Clause would justify a federal real estate security code. Grant S.
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to
Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L.
REv. 1, 164-69 (1999). Professor Nelson has continued to urge Congress to use its Commerce
Clause power to replace disparate provisions of state real estate law (such as real estate foreclosure
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§ 2 is to be broadly construed to extend its reach to the full extent of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 142
The Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,14
makes clear that a real estate mortgage loan is a transaction "involving
commerce" under FAA § 2, even if the borrower, lender, and mortgaged
land are all located in the same jurisdiction.'" Alafabco was an Alabama-
based fabrication and construction company, which in 1986 obtained an
operating credit line from Citizens Bank, an Alabama-based lender.' 45 In
1998, Alafabco bid upon a large contract for construction in Courtland,
Alabama, allegedly with Citizens Bank's encouragement.146  However,
Citizens Bank did not provide the credit needed to complete the project. 4 1
As a result, Alafabco allegedly had to complete the project by diverting
funds that otherwise would have been used to repay the debt to Citizens
Bank, resulting in a default.14 8 Alafabco and Citizens Bank then entered into
a written agreement restructuring the debt and securing the debt with
mortgages on both residential and commercial real estate in Alabama as well
as Alafabco's accounts receivable, inventory, supplies, fixtures, machinery,
and equipment.149  The agreement included a clause providing that "all
disputes, claims, or controversies" regarding the "construction,
interpretation, and enforcement" of the agreement would be resolved by
arbitration governed by the FAA. 'o Alafabco later filed suit against
Citizens Bank in Alabama state court alleging breach of contract, fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duty, while making several other state law claims arising
and enforcement of assignments of rents) with uniform federal legislation. See Nelson & Whitman,
supra note 38, at 1509-13; Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium:
"Yes" to Broad Congressional Control over Commercial Transactions; "No" to Federal Legislation
on Social and Cultural Issues, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1213, 1248 (2003); Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the
Mortgage Meltdown: A Brieffor the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L.
REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2010).
142. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (enforcing an arbitration
agreement contained in a contract to provide termite prevention service for a Birmingham, Alabama
home); see also OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 3:6, at 3-12 ("[Tlhe FAA § 2 term involving commerce is
the "functional equivalent of the more familiar term affecting commerce (i.e., words of art that
ordinarily signal the fullest and broadest permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power).").
143. 539 U.S. 52 (2003).
144. Id. at 53.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id
148. Id.
149. Id. at 53-54.
150. Id. at 54.
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out of Citizens Bank's failure to provide sufficient credit to complete the
Courtland project.' In response, Citizens Bank moved to compel
arbitration. 52 The trial court granted this motion, but the Alabama Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that "[b]ecause there was no showing 'that any
portion of the restructured debt was ... attributable to [out-of-state]
transactions,"' there was an "insufficient nexus with interstate commerce"
for the FAA to control the resolution of the dispute.13
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, remanding the
case to permit arbitration according to the debt-restructuring agreement.154
While the Court noted that Alafabco had used some of the restructured loans
on out-of-state projects and that the goods serving as collateral for the
restructured loans had moved in interstate commerce, the Court squarely
rejected any notion that Citizens Bank had to demonstrate that the
transaction had "substantial" interstate effects:
[Were there any residual doubt about the magnitude of the impact
on interstate commerce caused by the particular economic
transactions in which the parties were engaged, that doubt would
dissipate upon consideration of the "general practice" those
transactions represent. No elaborate explanation is needed to make
evident the broad impact of commercial lending on the national
economy or Congress' power to regulate that activity pursuant to
the Commerce Clause. 55
Consistent with this approach, courts have invoked the FAA in
enforcing arbitration agreements contained in manufactured home financing
contracts (which are analytically comparable to mortgages), 56 as well as
contracts for the purchase and sale of land, manufactured homes, or both.'5 7
As such, there is no doubt that a mortgage containing a clause requiring
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 54-55 (quoting Alafabco, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 872 So. 2d 798, 805 (Ala. 2002)).
154. Id. at 58.
155. Id. at 56-58 (citations omitted).
156. See, e.g., Toler v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., No. 08-0164, 2008 WL 2858728 (W.D. La.
July 24, 2008); H & S Homes, L.L.C. v. Shaner, 940 So. 2d 981 (Ala. 2006); Adams v. Greenpoint
Credit, L.L.C, 943 So. 2d 703 (Miss. 2006); In re Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C., No. 04-04-007940-CV,
2004 WL 2997924 (Tex. App. Dec. 29, 2004); see also Stevens v. Phillips, 852 So. 2d 123 (Ala.
2002) (sale of manufactured home substantially affected interstate commerce even though home was
manufactured and sold in Alabama to Alabama resident).
157. See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2000); Affholter v. Franklin
County Water Dist., No. 1:07-CV-0388, 2008 WL 5385810 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2008); Kinder
Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Clemens, 794 So. 2d 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Louisville Peterbilt,
Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2004).
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foreclosure by FAA arbitration would be a "contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" within the meaning of FAA § 2.'5'
2. Privatizing Foreclosure by Agreement in the Mortgage Would
Constitute "Arbitration" Within the Meaning of the FAA
The second threshold question in resolving the preemptive effect of
FAA § 2 is whether the contract contains an agreement to "arbitrate" the
dispute in question. 59 If the parties have agreed to "arbitration" governed
by the FAA, then § 2 preempts any contrary state law that would limit the
enforcement of their agreement.160 By contrast, if the parties' agreed-upon
dispute resolution process is not "arbitration," then the FAA does not apply
and could thus have no preemptive effect on otherwise applicable state
law. '6
The FAA does not specifically define arbitration.162 Applicable case
law suggests that whether the agreed-upon dispute resolution procedure is
arbitration is a function of "how closely the specified procedure resembles
classic arbitration, that is, where contestants empower a third party to render
a decision settling their dispute."l 63 As the Tenth Circuit noted:
Parties need not establish quasi-judicial proceedings resolving their
disputes to gain the protections of the FAA, but may choose from a
broad range of procedures and tailor arbitration to suit their peculiar
circumstances. However, one feature that must necessarily
appertain to a process to render it an arbitration is that the third
party's decision will settle the dispute.64
Thus, for example, federal courts have held that agreements for
appraising the value of property or property damage do not constitute
arbitration where the appraisal would not resolve all relevant issues in
158. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
159. See OEHME,supra note 61, § 1:1, at 1-7.
160. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-77 (1985).
161. See id. at 765.
162. Courts have uniformly concluded that the interpretation of the term "arbitration" is a matter
of federal law. E.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ'g Co., L.L.C. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684,
687 (10th Cir. 2004). As Oehnike notes,"[t]his is because federal law applies nationally and, as
such, meets the declared need of Congress for uniformity; moreover, relying on federal law avoids
the patchwork that would be woven together if the FAA meant one thing in one state and something
else in another." OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 1:1, at 1-7.
163. OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 1:1, at 1-7
164. Salt Lake Tribune. 390 F.3d at 690.
487
dispute between the parties.'6 1 In a similar fashion, federal courts have held
that the mandatory but nonbinding administrative proceeding dictated by the
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) does not
constitute arbitration within the meaning of the FAA, even though arbitrators
typically handle these proceedings.166
So, would a provision under which the mortgagor and mortgagee agree
to submit the foreclosure process to the determination and supervision of a
binding, neutral decision maker constitute arbitration, thus triggering FAA §
2's preemption of state law compelling judicial foreclosure? In attempting
to resolve this question, it is useful to articulate the four basic functions
served by the judicial foreclosure process. First, judicial foreclosure
resolves any question about the validity and priority of the lender's
mortgage, the existence of a default, and the lender's right to foreclose. 167
Second, judicial foreclosure accomplishes a sale of the mortgaged property,
subject to review and confirmation by the court to establish the sale's
compliance with applicable requirements.'16  Third, judicial foreclosure
serves a title-clearing function (i.e., it extinguishes subordinate interests so
that the foreclosure buyer receives title as it existed on the date on which the
mortgagor granted the mortgage that is being foreclosed).169 Fourth, judicial
foreclosure resolves how the sale proceeds should be distributed and any
liability of the mortgagor for a deficiency if the sale proceeds do not satisfy
the mortgage debt in full. 170
Most of the acts involved in accomplishing these functions involve basic
fact-finding and the making of legal conclusions-actions which are plainly
adjudicative in nature.' 7 1 Within the framework of the FAA and its
motivating policies, there is no meaningful difference between a judge's
165. E.g., id. at 691 (appraisal process for valuing option to acquire newspaper was not FAA
arbitration where agreement permitted, but did not require, parties to seek judicial guidance in
resolving certain disputes); Fulcrum Fin. Partners v. Meridian Leasing Corp., 230 F.3d 1004, 1008(7th Cir. 2000) (agreement for equipment appraisal was not FAA arbitration where appraisal did not
resolve allocation of sale proceeds among parties to settlement agreement).
166. E.g., Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C, 347 F.3d 370, 384-85 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying similar
reasoning in holding that UDRP administrative determination is not entitled to deference in
subsequent judicial proceeding); Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 377, 386 (4th Cir.
2003) (same); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 2003) (UDRP does not prevent either
party to domain name registration dispute from submitting dispute to judicial determination;
therefore UDRP dispute resolution mechanism is not FAA arbitration because it will not necessarily
settle the dispute); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality
Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REv. 123, 203 (2002) (private dispute resolution procedures
that incorporate substantive judicial review are not sufficiently "final" to constitute FAA arbitration).
167. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.11.
168. See id
169. See id. §§ 7.11, 7.14.
170. See id.§ 7.11.
171. See id.
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ruling that foreclosure is appropriate and a comparable ruling by an
arbitrator.172
But what of the conduct and supervision of the sale itself? At first
blush, one might argue that arbitration in this context would include only the
determination of factual and legal issues (e.g., the validity of the debt, the
existence of default, the mortgagee's right to foreclose, and the mortgagor's
liability for a deficiency), but not the conduct of the sale itself. If this is
correct, an agreement under which the parties agreed to have a private,
neutral arbitrator conduct and confirm a foreclosure sale would not be
arbitration under the FAA, and thus the FAA would not preempt otherwise
applicable state law compelling judicial foreclosure. Under this view, a
mortgagee could seek arbitration and obtain an arbitral award establishing
the mortgagee's right to have the property sold at foreclosure. However, the
mortgagee could not then conduct a sale without first obtaining a judicial
confirmation of the award and then obtaining a judicial sale (subject to
review and confirmation by the court). If that view is correct, foreclosure-
by-arbitration could provide no meaningful efficiency gains in comparison
to judicial foreclosure.
Yet there is no good reason to construe arbitration so narrowly.
Suppose, for example, that the mortgagor and mortgagee expressly agreed to
have the mortgagee's right to foreclose, but not the sale itself, resolved by
the final and binding determination of an arbitrator. Certainly, FAA § 2
would preempt a state's judicial foreclosure statute to the extent it purported
to require litigation of the mortgagee's right to foreclose. As with any other
arbitral award that complies with applicable requirements, an award
establishing the mortgagee's right to foreclose would receive the same
benefits of res judicata as would the judgment of a court and could be
confirmed by a court if necessary. 7 1
So why not allow the parties to agree to place the entire foreclosure
process-sale and all-in the arbitrator's control? The conduct, review, and
confirmation of a foreclosure sale, the distribution of foreclosure sale
proceeds, and the determination of any applicable deficiency are no less
"judicial" functions than is the determination of the mortgagee's right to
foreclose. It is true that a judicial foreclosure sale is not conducted by the
judge, but instead by an official such as the sheriff or clerk.'7 4 Yet this
172. OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 1:1, at 1-7.
173. U.S. West Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Buhler, Inc., 150 F.3d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 1998) ("A final
arbitration award, unless it is set aside for a legally sufficient reason, has same preclusive effect as
judgment."); EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 36:2, at 36-2.
174. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.4, at 15-16 (2d ed. 1993).
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distinction is purely technical; the sheriff or clerk acts only pursuant to the
judge's order, and in this sense, is carrying out judicial authority delegated
either by statute, court rules, or both.'7 5
To the extent the FAA establishes an effective equivalence between the
decisions of a judge and those of an arbitrator acting pursuant to and within
the scope of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, there is no structural barrier
to the development and use of a mortgage provision that privatizes the
foreclosure process through a comprehensive arbitration agreement. Courts
have recognized that arbitrators have broad equitable powers, including the
power to order specific performance of a contract even where the contract
does not provide for such relief,176 and American Arbitration Association
rules permit the arbitrator to "grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator
deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the
parties." 7 If the agreement authorizes the arbitrator to conduct a sale of the
mortgaged property and deliver a deed to the successful purchaser pursuant
to an arbitral award in favor of the mortgagee, the deed would be sufficient
to transfer title to the purchaser. In turn, the purchaser could use this deed as
the basis for a successful cause of action for possession of the land if the
mortgagor had not delivered possession voluntarily. 78
Courts interpreting the FAA have repeatedly noted that its purpose is
"'to relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an
alternative method for dispute resolution that would be speedier and less
costly than litigation."" 7 9  If the parties to a mortgage agree that the
arbitrator can order, conduct, and review the sale, a determination that the
decision making process is not arbitration within the meaning of the FAA
would frustrate both the agreement of the parties and the federal policy of
providing parties with an effective means to obtain binding adjudication
outside the public courts.
B. A Foreclosure-by-Arbitration Agreement in a Mortgage Is Not
Unconscionable Under Existing Law
FAA § 2 mandates the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements "'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
175. See, e.g., IOWA CT. R. 1.1018; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.04 (2000); Mo. R. CIV. PROC. 76.18.
176. 3 OEHMKE,supra note 61, § 119:2, at 119-3.
177. AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 43(a) (June 1, 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.
asp?id=22440#R43.
178. EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 41:3, at 41-2 to -3 ("award which is not confirmed. .. may
nevertheless serve as a cause of action, to be enforced in ordinary court procedure, as an action on
the award").
179. O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof' Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981)); see also
Booth v. Hume Publ'g, Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 932 (11th Cir. 1990).
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revocation of any contract.""'o Thus, generally applicable contract defenses
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability could invalidate an arbitration
agreement despite the general preemptive effect of FAA § 2.'81 However, a
state cannot decide that any agreement to arbitrate a particular type of
dispute is unenforceable:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under
general contract law principles and they may invalidate an
arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." . . . What States may not do is
decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms
(price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration
clause. The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind
of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal "footing,"
directly contrary to the Act's language and Congress' intent.'82
Within this framework, is there a substantial risk that a carefully-drafted
pre-dispute foreclosure-by-arbitration clause would be invalidated as
unconscionable? The most likely answer appears to be no.
As Professor Jeff Stempel has noted in discussing FAA § 2, all contract
authorities, including the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), recognize
unconscionability as an element of contract law; however, neither the UCC
nor leading judicial decisions define the term with any precision, and courts
vary substantially in their enthusiasm for its use as a means of policing
contract enforcement.183  Perhaps the most familiar treatment of
unconscionability comes from Professor Arthur Leff in his renowned article
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,184 in which
he describes unconscionability as having both a procedural component (how
the contract was formed) and a substantive component (the contract's
inherent fairness).'18  Professor Jeff Stempel has argued that procedural and
substantive unconscionability are "analytically distinct" and that each can
180. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 681 (quoting FAA § 2).
181. Id. at 682.
182. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (citation omitted).
183. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 757, 793-94 (2004).
184. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the New Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
185. Id. at 487.
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provide a legitimate basis for invalidating an arbitration provision.'16  The
weight of authority, however, suggests that courts will invalidate an
agreement to arbitrate as unconscionable only if it is both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable. 87
1. Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability focuses upon the relative bargaining
power between the parties and the extent to which the contract clearly
discloses its terms.'88  The typical argument that a mortgagor might raise
would be that the arbitration agreement is a product of adhesion rather than
bargaining and thus procedurally unconscionable for that reason. Indeed,
there is fairly substantial recent authority to this effect in California judicial
decisions, which have treated some arbitration agreements as procedurally
unconscionable if they were offered by the drafter on a "take it or leave it"
basis.189 This argument, however, seems both strained and out of step with
the weight of authority. First, there is nothing about a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement that is inherently procedurally unconscionable, particularly if the
agreement is labeled and appears in text no smaller than other provisions of
the underlying contract. Second, in standard form transactions, there is
typically no negotiation of any of the standard contract terms, whether those
terms involve agreements to arbitrate, attorney fee shifting clauses, or
provisions governing warranties or remedies. Every day, California
mortgage lenders make mortgage loans containing powers of sale on a "take
it or leave it" basis, with no negotiation over whether the mortgagor can
186. Stempel, supra note 183, at 795-98 (cataloguing cases in which courts have held arbitration
provisions unconscionable based upon the presence of only procedural or substantive problems).
187. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993) (concluding that most courts have required both
procedural and substantive unconscionability to exist before refusing to enforce an unambiguous
contract term); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1256 (2003). There is also recognition in the case law,
particularly in California, of a "sliding scale" in making this unconscionability determination: while
both substantive and procedural unconscionability are required, the greater the substantive
oppression reflected in the agreement, the less evidence ofprocedural unconscionability is necessary
to invalidate the agreement. See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1284 (9th Cir. 2006).
188. See Leff, supra note 184, at 487.
189. See Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1284 (finding an arbitration agreement procedurally
unconscionable, even if only minimally so, where one party "had overwhelming bargaining power,drafted the contract, and presented it to [the other party] on a take-it-or-leave-it basis"); Aral v.
EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 238 (2005) (finding "quintessential procedural
unconscionability" where "the terms of the [arbitration] agreement were presented on a 'take it or
leave it' basis ... with no opportunity to opt out"); Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (2001) (holding that the standards for procedural unconscionability are satisfied by
finding that an arbitration provision was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and that it was
oppressive due to "an inequality of bargaining power that result[ed] in no real negotiation and an
absence of meaningful choice").
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instead have a clause requiring judicial foreclosure. But this lack of
bargaining, by itself, cannot render the mortgage (or the power of sale)
procedurally unconscionable. Finally, courts in most states have not treated
arbitration agreements in standard form contracts as inherently suspect on
procedural unconscionability grounds.190  Instead, the more common
approach is reflected in Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Oblix, Inc. v.
Winiecki:
Standard-form agreements are a fact of life, and given § 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, arbitration provisions in these
contracts must be enforced unless states would refuse to enforce all
off-the-shelf package deals. . . . California routinely enforces
limited warranties and other terms found in form contracts... . If a
state treats arbitration differently, and imposes on form arbitration
clauses more or different requirements from those imposed on other
clauses, then its approach is preempted by § 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act.... It is in the end irrelevant whether the Supreme
Court of California wants to treat arbitration less favorably than
other promises in form contracts; no state can apply to arbitration
(when governed by the Federal Arbitration Act) any novel rule.
Under normal rules of contract, the promises Winiecki made in
order to be hired and paid are enforceable. Thus she must
arbitrate.19'
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Even if one indulged the assumption that standard form contracting is
inherently procedurally unconscionable, most courts would still enforce a
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreement unless it was also substantively
unconscionable.1 92 Substantive unconscionability concerns the terms of the
agreement and whether those terms are "so one-sided as to shock the
conscience. In this regard, a court would have to examine the particular
190. E.g., Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2004) (arbitration clause in employment
contract not procedurally unconscionable because it was presented as "take it or leave it");
Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002) (arbitration clause in
manufactured home financing contract not procedurally unconscionable due to relative imbalance in
sophistication of the parties); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999)
(arbitration clause in home improvement financing contract not procedurally unconscionable).
191. Oblix, Inc., 374 F.3d at 491-92 (citations omitted).
192. See, e.g., id.
193. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City
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provisions of the arbitration agreement itself. For example, courts have
found the following matters to be badges of substantive
unconscionability: (i) a provision requiring an employee or consumer to
arbitrate all claims against the employer or seller/service provider, but not
requiring the employer or seller/service provider to arbitrate claims against
the employee or consumer (a lack of "mutuality"); 194 (ii) a provision
requiring an employee to pay a filing fee to initiate an arbitration proceeding
and vesting in the employer the unilateral discretion whether to waive the
fee;'95 (iii) a provision limiting the nature of the remedies that the arbitrator
could provide,'96 particularly for violations of federal statutory claims;197 (iV)
a provision allowing one party to modify the existence, scope, or terms of
the arbitration agreement unilaterally and without notice;'98 and (v) a forum
selection provision requiring arbitration in a forum "so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the resisting party will for all practical purposes be
deprived of his day in court."' 99
Obviously, if a mortgage lender insisted upon including an arbitration
clause that contained such one-sided provisions, it would open itself up to
the risk that a court might deem the clause substantively unconscionable.
For example, a foreclosure-by-arbitration clause in a mortgage on Florida
land that purported to require arbitration in California would raise a serious
substantive unconscionability concern, particularly in a residential
transaction.2 00 Likewise, serious doubt would arise if a clause purported to
limit the defenses that the mortgagor could raise in arbitration (thus cutting
off defenses that the mortgagor could have raised in a judicial foreclosure),
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003).
194. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1285; Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1173; Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24
Cal. 4th 83, 117 (2000). Not all courts, however, require that a pre-dispute arbitration clause has to
be mutual, requiring both parties to submit their claims to arbitration. See, e.g., Harris, 183 F.3d at
180 ; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v.
Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1978); Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech
Pools, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 611 (Mass. 1982).
195. Circuit City Stores, 335 F.3d at 1107; Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1172.
196. One particularly troublesome issue has been whether an arbitration clause can effectively
prohibit class action relief Some decisions have held that a class action waiver is substantively
unconscionable. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).
197. Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11th Cir. 1998)(finding that a clause limiting award of damages to breach of contract claims only and not Title VII
claims "deprives the employee of any prospect for meaningful relief and is therefore
unenforceable.").
198. Dumais v. Am. Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2002); Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak
Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir.
1999).
199. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1287.
200. See, e.g., id. (holding unconscionable a provision requiring arbitration in a forum so
inconvenient "that the resisting party will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court").
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or to waive the anti-deficiency protection that the mortgagor would have
under state law.
However, this risk can be avoided by thorough, balanced, and cautious
drafting. If the mortgagee includes a provision that essentially replicates the
same substantive rules and procedures that would apply in a judicial
foreclosure-but on an accelerated timetable to permit the mortgagee to
avoid the time delays attendant to state court litigation-such a provision
appropriately could not be viewed as substantively unconscionable.
C. What About Nonsignatories? A Foreclosure-by-Arbitration Agreement
Could Be Enforced Against Junior Lienholders
So far, this Part has focused on the mortgagor and the mortgagee who
would have agreed to the mortgage containing the foreclosure-by-arbitration
clause. But what about third parties? As noted previously, one of the
primary functions served by the foreclosure process is the title-clearing
function.201 When conducted with proper authority, the foreclosure sale
delivers to the buyer title to the land as it existed on the date the mortgagor
granted the mortgage being foreclosed.202 For this to happen, any interests
that are junior to the mortgage lien being foreclosed, such as subsequent
mortgage liens or judgment liens, must be extinguished by the foreclosure
sale.203
Where foreclosure occurs by judicial process, due process of law
requires that the foreclosing mortgagee join as a party to the foreclosure any
person holding a junior encumbrance. 204 This joinder provides the junior
encumbrancer with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the
foreclosing mortgagee's lien and the mortgagee's right to foreclose that
lien.205 It also protects the junior encumbrancer's right to redeem his lien by
paying off the balance of the senior mortgage debt, or alternatively, to
protect his interest by bidding at the senior mortgagee's foreclosure sale.206
As a result, if the mortgagee fails to join a junior lienholder as a party to a
201. See supra text accompanying note 169.
202. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 7.17, at 843 & n.17 (title acquired is the "entire
interest and estate of mortgagor and mortgagee as it existed at the date of the mortgage").
203. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
204. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20 § 7.12, at 808-15 (discussing need for foreclosing
mortgagee to join "necessary" parties, such as those holding subordinate interests to be extinguished
by the foreclosure).
205. Id.
206. Id
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judicial foreclosure proceeding, the junior lienholder is not bound by the
court's judgment.207 If the mortgagee nevertheless conducts a foreclosure
sale, the purchaser will take the land subject to the interest of the unbound
junior lienholder.208 By contrast, if the mortgagee joins the holders of all
junior interests as parties, then any foreclosure sale following judgment will
extinguish those junior interests.209
Likewise, for foreclosure-by-arbitration to accomplish this title-clearing
function, the mortgagee would have to join any junior lienholder as a party
to the arbitration. FAA arbitration, however, is based upon an agreement to
arbitrate.2 10 In the typical case, a foreclosing mortgagee will not be in direct
contractual privity with a junior lienholder. So can a foreclosing mortgagee
compel a junior lienholder to arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration agreement
contained in a mortgage to which the junior was not a signatory?
Existing authority demonstrates that a nonsignatory to an arbitration
agreement may still enforce or be bound to that agreement under several
accepted theories of agency or contract. 2 11 Recognized theories include
agency, incorporation by reference, alter-ego, assumption, estoppel, third-
party beneficiary, and successor-in-interest.212 Several of these theories,
including agency,213 alter ego, 214 assumption, 215 estoppel,216 and third-party
207. Id.
208. For further discussion of the rights of the "omitted junior" encumbrancer and the foreclosure
sale purchaser, see id. § 7.15, at 823-33.
209. Id. § 7.14.
210. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
211. See infra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
212. See infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
213. When an agent negotiates a contract containing an arbitration provision on behalf of the
principal, the principal may be bound to arbitrate even if the principal did not sign the contract.
EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 13.2, at 13-5; OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 11.9, at 11-11. To bind a
principal by its agent's acts, an adverse claimant must demonstrate that the agent was acting on
behalf of the principal and that the cause of action arises out of that relationship. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 198-99 (3d
Cir. 2001). In the context of a mortgage foreclosure, such a relationship is unlikely to exist. At the
time a mortgage is granted, there typically are no outstanding interests junior to that mortgage; the
mortgagor can scarcely serve as an agent for a not-yet-in-existence principal. There is one situation
where a junior encumbrance may already exist because of the priority the mortgage law accords to
the purchase money mortgagee. Suppose, for example, that X buys land from S and grants S a
purchase money mortgage to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price. Suppose further that
at the time of the purchase, X is already subject to a judgment in the amount of $200,000 in favor of
C, and that under state law, the lien of that judgment attaches to the land as soon as X acquires title.
Technically, C's judgment lien against the land will arise either contemporaneously with (or very
slightly prior to) S's purchase money mortgage lien. Nevertheless, under mortgage law, S's
purchase money mortgage holds priority over C's judgment lien. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTGAGES § 7.2(b) (1996); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 9.1, at 1107-17. However,
there would be no reason to presume that a judgment creditor like C would have impliedly deputized
X to bind C to an arbitration clause in any mortgage that X later granted on any land X subsequently
acquired.
214. Courts have held that a nonparty may be bound to an arbitration agreement where the
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beneficiary,2 17 provide no support for binding a junior lienholder to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement contained in a senior mortgage. The
nonparty is merely the instrumentality or alter ego of a signatory to that agreement. EDMONSON,
supra note 63, § 13.6, at 13-15; OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 11.11, at 11-13. Courts typically apply
the alter ego theory in cases where "the alter ego so dominates and controls the affairs of the
signatory such that the signatory cannot be said to have any independent existence or will of its
own." EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 13.6, at 13-17; see also WorldCrisa Corp. v. Armstrong, 129
F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between Keystone Shipping Co. and Texport Oil Co.,
782 F. Supp. 28, 30-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Menaker v. Padover, 427 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980). In the typical situation, there will be no such relationship between the mortgagor and a junior
encumbrancer.
215. Courts have held that a nonparty can be bound to arbitrate if its conduct demonstrates that it
has assumed the party's obligations under an agreement that contains an arbitration provision. See
EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 13.7, at 13-18; OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 11:4, at 11-6. See also
Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Arbitrartion
Between Keystone Shipping, 782 F. Supp. at 30; Petition of Transol Navegacao S.A., 782 F. Supp.
848, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). It is possible that a junior encumbrancer could agree to assume the
mortgagor's obligations under a senior mortgage, but such assumption agreements are extremely
rare. In the typical case, a junior encumbrancer will simply have acquired its lien "subject to" the
priority of the senior encumbrance, but will not have assumed any personal obligation to pay the
senior debt or otherwise perform the personal obligations of the mortgagor on that debt. See
generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 5.3.
216. Courts have held that a nonsignatory can enforce an arbitration agreement against the
signatory on estoppel grounds, particularly when the issues for resolution are intertwined with the
underlying contract obligations and closely linked to a dispute that is subject to arbitration under the
agreement. OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 11:6, at 11-7 and § 11:7, at 11-8. See also Sunkist Soft
Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (1lth Cir. 1993); McBro Planning & Dev.
Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir. 1984); Hughes Masonry Co., Inc. v.
Greater Clark County School Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1981). However, courts have
not allowed a signatory to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate under this theory. See, e.g., E.
DuPont de Nemours, 269 F.3d at 199-202; MAG Portfolio Consultant, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed
Group L.L.C., 268 F.3d 58, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2001). A nonsignatory can be equitably estopped from
refusing to comply with an arbitration agreement if the nonsignatory receives a direct benefit from
the contract containing that agreement. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen
GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2000); Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard S.P.A.,
170 F.3d 349, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1999); OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 11:8, at 11-10. In the typical case,
however, a junior encumbrance will arise only after the senior mortgage, and thus the junior
encumbrancer has not received any direct benefit from the contract evidencing the senior
encumbrance.
217. Under third-party beneficiary analysis, a nonsignatory may compel arbitration if the
signatories to the contract containing the arbitration clause agreed to confer upon the nonsignatory
the benefits of the contract. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 94748 (11 th Cir.
1999); OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 11:5, at 11-6. In turn, courts will compel a nonsignatory to a
contract containing an arbitration clause to arbitrate if the nonsignatory is a third-party beneficiary
who has accepted the benefits of the contract. Int'l Paper Co., 206 F.3d at 418; Am. Bureau of
Shipping, 170 F.3d at 352-53; OEHMKE, supra note 61, § 11:8, at 11-10. In the typical case,
however, a junior encumbrance will arise only after the senior mortgage, and thus the junior
encumbrancer cannot be said to have been an intended beneficiary of the contract evidencing the
senior encumbrance.
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incorporation by reference and successor-in-interest theories, however, bear
further study.
Courts have held that a nonparty may be bound to an arbitration
agreement if there is a separate agreement between the signatory and the
nonparty which incorporates the arbitration agreement by reference.218 For
example, most courts have enforced arbitration agreements against nonparty
guarantors or sureties where the arbitration agreements were incorporated by
reference into guaranties or performance bonds.219
Because a junior mortgagee takes its interest in the mortgaged premises
subject to all interests of which it has constructive notice, a senior mortgagee
might argue that an arbitration clause contained in a properly recorded senior
mortgage should be deemed incorporated into the junior mortgage by
reference. However, such an argument is weak. First, even if a junior lien is
evidenced by a written agreement between the mortgagor and the junior
lienholder (e.g., a second mortgage), that agreement likely will not
incorporate the terms of the senior mortgage by specific reference. Second,
many junior liens (such as judgment liens arising out of tort claims) are not
evidenced by any written agreement at all-with such liens, there is no
agreement into which the arbitration agreement could be incorporated, by
reference or otherwise. Finally, no court decisions have extended the
incorporation-by-reference theory to include this type of "constructive
notice" argument.
Instead, the constructive notice argument more naturally fits within the
"successor-in-interest" theory. In certain circumstances, a successor to a
person that is a party to a contract containing an arbitration agreement is
bound by that arbitration agreement. Where a successor expressly takes on
all rights and obligations of another party under a contract containing an
arbitration clause, a court will compel the successor to arbitrate if the
assignment was sufficiently broad to cover the obligation to arbitrate. 22 0 By
itself, however, the assumption principle is not sufficient to establish the
enforceability of an arbitration clause in a senior mortgage against a junior
218. EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 13.4, at 13-10; OEHMKE,supra note 61,§ 11:3, at 11-6.
219. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. W. Point Constr. Co., 837 F.2d 1507, 1508 (1lth Cir. 1988);
EDMONSON,supra note 63, § 13:5, at 13-11. According to the Domke treatise:
Originally, the trend towards the enforcement of arbitration provisions incorporated in
performance bonds or guaranties was fueled by federal circuit courts which exhibited a
stronger tendency to enforce arbitration between owners and sureties on performance
bonds where the performance bonds incorporated, by a specific reference, a contract
containing an arbitration clause ... governed by the [FAA].
A majority of state courts have followed suit in compelling sureties to arbitrate where
the bond incorporates an agreement containing an arbitration provision. However, a
minority continues to hold that a party must expressly agree to arbitrate before it will be
compelled to arbitrate.
EDMONSON, supra note 63, § 13:5, at 13-11 to -12 (footnotes omitted).
220. EDMONSON,supra note 63, § 13.13, at 13-26.
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encumbrancer. Under mortgage law generally, a transferee of mortgaged
property is deemed to take that property subject to the terms of existing
mortgages, but does not assume the mortgagor's personal obligations under
the existing mortgage absent an express assumption of those obligations. 22 1
But what if the senior mortgage expressly provided that the arbitration
clause was binding upon the mortgagor and the mortgagor's heirs,
successors, and assigns? In other words, what if the senior mortgage
provided that the arbitration clause was a covenant that would run with the
land? Would this be sufficient to turn the arbitration agreement into a
covenant binding a junior encumbrancer as a successor to the mortgagor's
interest? Under both the weight of common law authority and the position
expressed in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, the
answer appears to be yes.222
1. The Common Law: Does an Arbitration Agreement "Touch and
Concern" Land?
Under the traditional common law rules, a signatory seeking to enforce
an arbitration clause against a successor-in-interest would have to show that
(1) the clause was intended to run with the land to bind successors, (2) the
clause "touched and concerned" the land, and (3) the successor took its
interest with notice of the clause.223 If the clause by its express terms bound
the original parties and their heirs, successors, and assigns, this would
demonstrate the intent of the original parties for the clause to run to bind
successors. 224  Likewise, assuming the clause appeared in an instrument
recorded within the chain of title to the land, the successor would take with
constructive notice of the clause. 225 Thus, the enforceability of the covenant
against a successor would come down to whether the covenant requiring
arbitration of disputes "touched and concerned" the land in question.
221. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 20, § 5.3, at 394.
222. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes (2000).
223. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW § 10.3, at 342
(6th ed. 2005); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.22, at 493
(3d ed. 2000). Because the covenantee would be seeking an equitable remedy (i.e., specific
performance of the arbitration agreement) he would not have to establish privity of estate between
the parties as traditionally required for a covenant to run with the land at law. HOVENKAMP, supra,
§ 10.3, at 343.
224. STOEBUCK, supra note 223, § 8.16, at 481 ("Obviously the use of the word 'assigns' is highly
persuasive of an intent to bind successors.").
225. HOVENKAMP, supra note 223, § 10.3, at 345; STOEBUCK, supra note 223, § 8.28, at 500.
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Would a covenant to use arbitration to foreclose mortgaged land "touch
and concern" that land? At first blush, one might argue that the answer
would be no. Traditionally, courts were reluctant to enforce a covenant
against successors unless both the benefit and the burden of the covenant
touched and concerned the land; if the benefit of a covenant was "in gross,"
or personal to the covenantee, the burden of the covenant did not run to bind
successors to the covenantor.226 On the one hand, one might argue that a
covenant regarding the manner of dispute resolution does not inherently
benefit the land or enhance its use and enjoyment. Under this view, the
benefits of such a covenant (i.e., the ostensible efficiency savings or
autonomy benefits to be obtained from an arbitral adjudication) could be
characterized as a personal benefit to the covenantee (in this context, the
foreclosing mortgagee). On the other hand, the foreclosing mortgagee could
argue that because the arbitration agreement reduces its potential
enforcement costs, that agreement increases the value of its mortgage, and
thus should be viewed as "touching and concerning" the mortgagee's
interest in the mortgaged land. The latter analysis is more persuasive in that
to the extent both parties have an interest in the mortgaged land, an
agreement to arbitrate disputes regarding their respective interests benefits
each of them as owners.227
There appear to be no reported cases addressing whether an arbitration
clause in a mortgage would run with the land to bind successors. However,
a number of cases have arisen in the contexts of other conveyances, and the
weight of this authority holds that an arbitration agreement is a covenant that
runs with the land to bind a successor. 228 Most of the case law involves
leases, with the leading case being the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in
Abbott v. Bob's U-Drive.229 Abbott leased land to Thompson by virtue of a
lease under which Thompson agreed to operate two auto leasing businesses
226. R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 627 (2d ed. 2006); see also
Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) (covenant
obligating lot buyer to use covenantee's contracting firm to construct first residence did not "touch
and concern" land); Bremmeyer Excavating, Inc. v. McKenna, 721 P.2d 567 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
(covenantor's promise to use a particular company's excavating services on a particular parcel of
land did not run to bind covenantor's successor).
227. This is perhaps more apparent by considering the example of a residential common interest
community in which all lots are subject to a recorded declaration that includes a reciprocal
restriction requiring lot owners to resolve certain types of disputes through arbitration. If the benefit
of the arbitration agreement were viewed as personal, the burden of the arbitration agreement would
not run to bind successors, and the arbitration agreement would thus become unenforceable as lots in
the community "turned over." Instead, it is more appropriate to argue that the arbitration agreement
plausibly benefits the value of each lot (and thus each lot owner as a lot owner) by providing a more
expedient and efficient process for resolving neighborhood disputes.
228. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bob's U-Drive, 352 P.2d 598 (Or. 1960).
229. Id.
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(one for short-term leases and one for long-term leases).230 The lease
contained a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute arising under the
lease.231 Thompson incorporated two corporations-Bob's U-Drive (which
engaged in short-term leasing) and Continental (which engaged in long-term
leasing).232 The following year, Thompson assigned all of his interest under
the lease to Bob's U-Drive in writing.233 No written assignment was made
to Continental, although both corporations continued operating out of the
234premises.
Four years into the lease term, a dispute arose over payment of rent.235
Abbott filed a petition seeking to compel Bob's U-Drive and Continental to
arbitrate regarding rent due under the lease. 236 Bob's U-Drive consented to
arbitration but Continental did not, arguing that it was neither an assignee
nor a signatory bound by the arbitration agreement.237 The court concluded
that Continental was an implied co-assignee of the lease along with Bob's
U-Drive, based upon the fact that "both corporations were occupying
portions of the leasehold premises and had been paying rent."238 The court
then addressed the question of whether the covenant to submit lease disputes
to arbitration ran with the lease and concluded that the arbitration agreement
was a covenant running with the land:
A covenant to pay rent clearly 'touches and concerns' the land. It
would seem to follow that a covenant to arbitrate a question with
respect to rental payments should also be regarded as relating to the
property interests of the original covenanting parties as lessor and
lessee. As stated in Clark [on Covenants], "there would seem to be
no reason for applying the rule of touching and concerning in an
overtechnical manner, which is unreal from the standpoint of the
parties themselves." Clark suggests the following as a practical test:
"Where the parties, as laymen and not as lawyers, would
naturally regard the covenant as intimately bound up with the land,
230. Id. at 600.
231. Id. at 599-600.
232. Id at 600.
233. Id
234. Id
235. Id.
236. Id
237. Id
238. Id. at 602.
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aiding the promisee as landowner or hampering the promisor in
similar capacity, the requirement should be held fulfilled." 23 9
The court concluded that "the average person accepting the assignment
of a lease containing a covenant to arbitrate questions relating to the terms of
the lease would normally assume that he was bound by the covenant." 240
The court also noted that in previous decisions, courts had held that
provisions for reappraisal and resetting of rent had been treated as running
with the land.2 4' The court thus concluded that the assignment was
"sufficient to carry with it the covenant to arbitrate contained in the written
lease."242
Likewise, the California Court of Appeal in Kelly v. Tri-Cities
Broadcasting, Inc, 243 reached a similar result. Kelly involved a dispute
arising out of the purchase by Tri-Cities Broadcasting, Inc. (Tri-Cities) of a
radio business from Far West Broadcasting Corp. (Far West).2 " The
business was operated on land leased from the father of Robert and Richard
Kelly, and the lease obligated the lessee to provide five minutes of airtime
daily to the lessor or its assignee for advertising purposes. 245 The lease also
contained an arbitration agreement stated to be binding upon the parties and
their assignees. 246 At the time of the sale of the business, Tri-Cities took an
assignment of the lease.24 7 Subsequently, Tri-Cities relocated its transmitter
to another site and refused to provide airtime to the Kellys.2 48 In response,
the Kellys filed a complaint seeking to enforce against Tri-Cities the
obligation to pay rent under the lease and to compel Tri-Cities to arbitrate
the dispute under the arbitration agreement. 249 Tri-Cities argued that it was
not bound by the agreement to arbitrate, but the court disagreed, concluding
that the agreement ran with the land to bind Tri-Cities.25 0 Noting that case
authority was "sparse," 251 the court relied upon the Bob's U-Drive decision
in stating that "[t]he Oregon Supreme Court concluded a covenant to
239. Id. at 604 (citing CHARLES E. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 99
(2d ed. 1947)).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. One judge dissented, noting that while a covenant to pay rent ran with the land, "a
covenant to arbitrate is personal and does not run with the land." Id. at 606 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
243. 195 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Ct. App. 1983).
244. Id. at 304.
245. Id. at 304-05. The opinion does not clearly explain whether the lessee was to provide this air
time in lieu of monetary rent or in addition to monetary rent stated elsewhere in the lease.
246. Idat 306.
247. Id. at 304.
248. Id. at 305 n.1.
249. Id. at 306.
250. Id. at 306, 311.
251. Id. at 310.
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arbitrate was a covenant running with the land. We agree and would treat it
as similar to a covenant to pay rent upon which it rests for the conclusion
that such a covenant 'touches and concerns the land."'
252
Subsequently, the California courts reaffirmed this view in Melchor
Investment Co. v. ROLM Systems.253 Melchor leased two buildings to
ROLM Corporation (ROLM Corp.) for a term of twenty years under a lease
containing an arbitration clause.254 Ten years into the lease term, ROLM
Corp. merged into IBM, which assumed ROLM Corp.'s obligations under
the lease. 25 5 Two years later, IBM, with the consent of Melchor, subleased
the buildings to ROLM Systems for a term of five years.256 During the
sublease, a dispute arose regarding the condition of the roof.257 When
ROLM Systems demanded arbitration, Melchor filed an action to enjoin
arbitration on the grounds that it had no privity of contract with ROLM
Systems.258 The trial court denied the injunction and ordered arbitration,259
and the California Court of Appeal dismissed Melchor's appeal:
Lessor [Melchor] concedes that sublessor [IBM] can compel it to
arbitrate pursuant to the lease. The parties here argue about whether
sublessee expressly agreed to be bound by the arbitration provision
in the lease, in other words, whether there is contractual privity
between lessor [Melchor] and sublessee [ROLM Systems]. Kelly v.
Tri-Cities Broadcasting, Inc.... demonstrates the irrelevance of
this concern. Privity of estate, not privity of contract, is dispositive
here.... Kelly concluded that a covenant to arbitrate, like a
covenant to pay rent, touches and concerns and therefore runs with
the land... . In this case since sublessee remains an occupant of the
property, sublessee and lessor are bound to arbitrate by privity of
estate even if sublessee did not expressly assume this obligation of
sublessor.260
252. Id. at 311.
253. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 (Ct. App. 1992).
254. Id. at 344-45.
255. Id. at 344.
256. Id
257. Id. at 345.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id at 346-47 (citations omitted); see also Lansdale v. Marina Pacifica Homeowners' Ass'n,
No. B192520, 2007 WL 2307043 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2007) (lease provision requiring appraisal
was arbitration provision governed by California arbitration statute and was binding against
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Courts have also held that a pre-dispute arbitration clause contained in
an easement agreement "touches and concerns" land. In Baker v. Conoco
Pipeline Co., 261 Lawrence and Betty Baker sued Conoco for damages to
trees and vegetation on their land due to Conoco's having mowed a fifty-
foot strip of the Bakers' land.262 This strip of land was located over a
pipeline that Conoco maintained across the Baker land pursuant to a
recorded easement granted by a predecessor of the Bakers.263 Conoco
sought a stay and an order compelling arbitration of the dispute, arguing that
the easement agreement contained an arbitration clause.26 The Bakers
argued that the easement agreement was a personal contract binding only the
original parties.265 The court, however, held that the arbitration agreement
was a covenant running with the land and thus bound the Bakers, who were
in privity of estate with the original covenantor by virtue of their succession
to ownership of the land.266 Rejecting the Bakers' argument that the
arbitration agreement was personal, the court noted:
The second requirement for a successor to the covenantee's estate to
compel the performance of the covenant is that the covenant's
benefit must "touch and concern" the land. .. . This element is
easily dispensed with in this case because the arbitration provision
in the easement granting a right-of-way to lay pipelines provides the
exclusive procedure for resolving disputes over damage to crops,
fences, and timber, which clearly "touch and concern" the real
property. 267
The judge reached the identical determination in a companion case,
Cason v. Conoco Pipeline Co. 268
successors to the original lease).
261. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
262. Id. at 1292.
263. Id. at 1291-92.
264. Id. at 1292.
265. Id. at 1295.
266. Id. at 1298. Because Conoco was seeking equitable relief (specific enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate), it is not clear why the Baker court felt it necessary or appropriate to evaluate
whether the Bakers were in privity of estate with the prior landowner at the time the easement was
created. Under the traditional approach, privity of estate was not required for the burden of a
covenant to bind successors as a servitude in equity. Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143,
1144 (Ch.); HOVENKAMP, supra note 223, § 10.3, at 343; STOEBUCK, supra note 223, § 8.26, at 498.
267. Baker, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1297-98 (citation omitted).
268. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
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2. The Restatement of Servitudes
The conclusion that an arbitration agreement would constitute a
servitude running with the land to bind a successor would also follow if one
analyzes the issue under the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.
The new Restatement rejects the historical "touch and concern" standard as
outmoded and unpredictable.269 Instead, it provides that a servitude is valid
unless it is "illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy."270
Adopting a strong freedom-of-contract approach to the creation of servitudes
and their enforcement against successors, the Restatement "shift[s] to the
party claiming invalidity of a servitude the burden to establish that it is
illegal or unconstitutional, or violates public policy." 271' To defeat the
enforcement of a covenant as a servitude, the successor must establish that
the servitude (1) "is arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious;" 272 (2) "unreasonably
burdens a fundamental constitutional right;"273 (3) "imposes an unreasonable
restraint on alienation;" 274 (4) "imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade or
competition;' 275 or (5) "is unconscionable."276
A careful reading of the commentary to the Restatement leaves little
doubt that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a mortgage would
constitute a servitude binding against a successor such as a junior lienholder.
While a pre-dispute arbitration agreement may constitute an indirect restraint
on alienation, it is not arbitrary,277 spiteful,278 capricious,279 or
269. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000) ("Neither the burden nor the
benefit of a covenant is required to touch or concern land in order for the covenant to be valid as a
servitude.").
270. Id. § 3.1.
271. Id. § 3.1 cmt. a.
272. Id. § 3.1(1).
273. Id. § 3.1(2).
274. Id §§ 3.1(3), 3.4, 3.5.
275. Id. § § 3.1(4), 3.6.
276. Id. §§ 3.1(5), 3.7.
277. Id. § 3.1 cmt. g ("Arbitrary normally means that the purpose is not legitimate, or that the
means adopted have no reasonable relationship to accomplishment of the purpose."). Given the
fundamental pro-arbitration policy reflected in the FAA, the purpose of a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement must be viewed as legitimate.
278. Id ("Spiteful means that the primary purpose of the servitude was to cause harm to another,
rather than to secure a benefit to the creating party or parties."). Given the efficiency benefits
arbitration potentially provides, one could not reasonably conclude that a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement was spiteful unless its content was so one-sided as to be substantively unconscionable.
279. Id. ("Capricious generally means that no legitimate purpose for creating the servitude is
discernible."). Again, given the fundamental pro-arbitration policy articulated in the FAA, one
could not conclude that a pre-dispute foreclosure-by-arbitration clause served no legitimate purpose.
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unconscionable, 2 80 and it does not constitute an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. Though the Restatement requires that a servitude imposing a
direct restraint on alienation can be enforced only where enforcement is
reasonable under the circumstances,281 a servitude imposing an indirect
restraint on alienation is enforceable as long as it is supported by a rationaljustification:282
Many economic arrangements for spreading the purchase price of
property over time and for allocating risk and sharing profit from
property development can be attacked as indirect restraints on
alienation. If such arrangements are not unconscionable and do not
otherwise violate public policy, there is usually no reason to deny
the parties freedom of contract. The parties are usually in a better
position than judges to decide the economic trade-offs that will
enable a transaction to go forward and enhance their overall
value.283
Further, the comments to the Restatement leave little doubt that, at least
in the context of a common interest development, a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement in the declaration would be enforceable:
9. The declaration of covenants for the Seaside Property Owners
Association requires that all disputes over the amount of
assessments for required maintenance of common areas owned by
the Association be resolved by arbitration. The declaration provides
a method for selecting arbitrators, provides that their decision shall
be final, and provides that property owners waive their rights to
challenge maintenance assessments in a court of law. In the
absence of other facts or circumstances, the conclusion would bejustified that this provision is effective to deny current beneficiaries
of the servitudes the right to sue over assessments. 28
Finally, a pre-dispute arbitration agreement would have no meaningful
impact upon trade or competition and, given the overwhelming pro-
280. See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
281. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (2000) ("A servitude that imposes a
direct restraint on alienation of the burdened estate is invalid if the restraint is unreasonable.
Reasonableness is determined by weighing the utility of the restraint against the injurious
consequences of enforcing the restraint.").
282. Id. § 3.5 ("An otherwise valid servitude is valid even if it indirectly restrains alienation by
limiting the use that can be made of property, by reducing the amount realizable by the owner on
sale or other transfer of the property, or by otherwise reducing the value of the property.. .. A
servitude that lacks a rational justification is invalid.").
283. Id. § 3.5 cmt. a.
284. Id. § 8.1, cmt. d, illus. 9.
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285 tbev'w
arbitration policy reflected in the FAA, cannot be viewed as contrary to
public policy. As a result, under the Restatement's analysis, a foreclosing
mortgagee could enforce a pre-dispute foreclosure-by-arbitration covenant
against a junior lienholder as a servitude.
IV. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Part III demonstrates that there are no structural legal barriers
preventing a mortgagor and mortgagee from agreeing to privatize the
foreclosure process through an arbitration agreement, even in states where
statutes purport to require judicial foreclosure.286 Thus, if judicial
foreclosure becomes too cumbersome and time-consuming, or if (as
proposed by the National Consumer Law Center) some states take away
power of sale foreclosure as an enforcement option for the mortgagee,
mortgagees could choose to begin using pre-dispute arbitration agreements
as a means to privatize and streamline the foreclosure process.
Before concluding, however, there are two remaining questions that
deserve note (and perhaps further exploration outside of this article). The
first question is whether there may be another explanation for why
mortgagees have not incorporated foreclosure-by-arbitration clauses into
mortgages. As noted previously, the most plausible explanations are the
availability of power-of-sale foreclosure (in those states that authorize it)287
and the lack of foreclosure-by-arbitration provisions in mortgage forms
approved by secondary market purchasers (even in judicial-foreclosure-only
states). 288 However, critics of arbitration often argue that its ostensible
efficiency benefits are overrated, and that arbitration is often no more timely
or inexpensive than litigation.289 This implicates another possible
explanation: if judicial foreclosure is in fact just as quick and inexpensive as
arbitration in practice, it is predictable that parties would likely contract for
judicial foreclosure rather than foreclosure-by-arbitration.290 In this respect,
285. See supra notes 126-79 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 114-285 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 104.
290. One empirical study of the contracting patterns of certain companies indicated that while
over seventy-five percent of their consumer contracts contained mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses, less than ten percent of their negotiated commercial contracts contained such clauses,
perhaps suggesting that companies may value or prefer litigation as a means of resolving business-
to-business disputes. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871
507
the relative speed and cost of judicial foreclosure (as compared to a potential
substitute arbitral process) is an empirical question on which more current
data would be useful.29 ' The ABA Real Property, Trust and Estate Section is
currently updating its fifty-state survey on foreclosure, last published in
1995.292 When available, the results of this project could provide some
useful (albeit predominantly anecdotal) information on the timeliness of
foreclosure in judicial-foreclosure-only states.
The second question is the normative one: should parties be allowed to
contract for FAA arbitration as a substitute for judicial foreclosure? I have
consciously not addressed this question in this article, in which I intended to
focus in a descriptive way on whether foreclosure-by-arbitration was
structurally feasible. As to the normative question, however, I will offer a
few closing thoughts.
I can see no reason to prevent commercial lenders and borrowers from
agreeing to privatize the foreclosure process through arbitration. The
residential mortgage market presents a more complicated picture.
Mandatory arbitration of consumer disputes is widespread, 29 3 and one can
proffer a case that foreclosure-by-arbitration would offer efficiency gains
versus judicial foreclosure that would benefit residential borrowers in
reduced borrowing costs. 294  Nevertheless, I have some lingering doubts
about whether sound policy should permit foreclosure-by-arbitration clauses
in residential mortgages. First, given the influence of the modem secondary
mortgage market and standardized mortgage forms, there is no meaningful
negotiation over mortgage terms in the residential context.295 Thus, the
(2008).
291. It is worth remembering, however, that the relevant comparison is not between the time and
expense of judicial foreclosure versus the time and expense of arbitration generally. To ensure that
foreclosure-by-arbitration provides the intended efficiency gains over judicial foreclosure, a
foreclosure-by-arbitration agreement should (and presumably would) provide for an expedited
process for pleading, hearing, and sale--one that would occur more quickly than judicial process in
public courts (presumably, one that would occur on a timetable similar to foreclosures conducted
under power of sale).
292. FORECLOSuRE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES, supra note 44.
293. To this point, efforts to obtain federal legislation barring the use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in home loan contracts have been unsuccessful, though the Arbitration Fairness Act of
2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., Ist Sess., remains pending. Failed efforts include the proposed
Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2003, S. 1928, 108th Cong. § 4; the proposed Save
Our Homes Act, H.R. 3322, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003); the proposed Responsible Lending Act, H.R.
833, 108th Cong. (2003); and the proposed Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act,
H.R. 1663, 108th Cong. (2003).
294. Professor Stephen Ware has offered this defense of mandatory consumer arbitration (though
not specifically in the context of mortgage foreclosure). Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DiSP. RESOL. 89;
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 195,213 (1998) (arguing that consumers should have an alienable right "to get consideration for the right
of government adjudication").
295. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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assumption of consumer consent to foreclosure by arbitration (or the notion
that consumers could obtain meaningful "consideration" for waiving the
right to judicial foreclosure) seems tenuous. Second, the cost of the
arbitrator's fee-which one could easily dismiss as proportionally trivial in
the context of a commercial transaction-could be disproportionately large
in the context of a residential mortgage loan. If this fee were charged to the
mortgagor (as would be the case under the language of the typical
mortgage), it would consume an additional (and perhaps unwarranted)
portion of the mortgagor's equity in the land, or increase the mortgagor's
liability for a deficiency. Third, one of the ostensible benefits of
arbitration-its privacy 296-is one of its more noxious characteristics from
the perspective of the public interest. In states requiring judicial foreclosure,
foreclosure happens in the open sunlight of the public courts. In the past two
years, this public process has exposed non-trivial levels of negligent,
abusive, and/or fraudulent mortgage servicing, the details of which might
have remained out of the public eye under a system that privatized
foreclosure altogether. This concern almost certainly played a part in the
decisions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac not to purchase mortgage loans
containing pre-dispute arbitration agreements.297 Finally, it is increasingly
clear that dishonesty and fraud played and continues to play a nontrivial role
in the residential mortgage crisis-from borrowers being taken advantage of
by mortgage brokers and subprime lenders, to distressed homeowners now
falling prey to foreclosure "rescue" scams.29  If there were widespread use
of foreclosure-by-arbitration, there is little doubt that new firms would
develop to provide this particular service. But would such firms be
sufficiently independent of foreclosing lenders for the firms to produce
independent and unbiased decision making? The recent controversy about
the National Arbitration Forum and its handling of consumer debt-collection
cases299 raise a cautionary warning, and has certainly provided wind in the
sails of critics of mandatory consumer arbitration.
296. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
298. Jessica Holzer, U.S. Plans to Combat Mortgage Fraud, Rescue Scams, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123902916166993009.html; Bob Tedeschi, A Crackdown on
Rescue Schemes, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/realestate/
21mort.html.
299. On July 14, 2009, Minnesota's Attorney General filed suit against the National Arbitration
Forum, the nation's largest provider of arbitration for debt collection. This suit alleged that through
various financial connections, the NAF was owned and controlled by entities that owned and
controlled the three largest debt collection companies in the U.S., which filed over half the claims
processed annually by the NAF. The suit also alleged that the NAF and these debt collection
509
As this article has suggested, foreclosure by arbitration is possible in the
residential setting. If that is bad policy, state law cannot prevent it given the
FAA's pre-emptive effect. As a result, Congress would have to act to
prevent it, amending the FAA to make clear that it would not pre-empt statejudicial-foreclosure-only laws (at least with respect to residential mortgage
loans). If adopted, the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 would dojust that by carving out consumer disputes from the coverage of the FAA.3"
companies sought to conceal this financial relationship to maintain the appearance that the NAF was
independent in its administration of the arbitrations filed by those companies. On July 17, 2009, the
NAF entered into a settlement under which it agreed to discontinue all consumer arbitrations. The
findings of an investigation of the NAF by the majority staff of the Domestic Policy Subcommittee
of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee included the following:
1. [Nearly] all NAF "consumer arbitrations" [were] debt collection actions brought by
creditors or assignees (claim purchasers) ... and [were] decided in the creditors' favor.
3. Arbitrators in most of claims ignored ... evidence of whether ... claims were
brought within the statute of limitations.
4. Arbitrators in most of the claims ignored lack of specific evidence of who was
actually served with the notice of the arbitration.
6. All arbitrators ignored evidence that should have resulted in dismissal of most of the
claims.
7. One ... arbitrator who did not ignore such evidence and did dismiss a lot of cases,
ended up without any additional cases being assigned to him ....
8. The NAF . . . did not follow its own rules and sent claims to arbitrators despite the
fact that those claims should have been dismissed for failure of the creditor to serve
notice or [sic] the arbitration "promptly."
9. The NAF is violating California law by refusing to publish the results of many of its
California arbitrations.
STAFF OF DOMESTIC POLICY SUBCOMMITEE MAJORITY, HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT
REFORM COMMIT-EE, II lITH CONG., REPORT ON ARBITRATION ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF
CLAIMS FILES OF THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM 2, available at http://domesticpolicy.
oversight.house.gov/documents/20090721154944.pdf.
300. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong.,, would amend FAA § 2 to
provide that "[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires
arbitration of (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute." H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4
(2009). Furthermore, the Act would establish that the validity or enforceability of a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement would be determined by a court rather than the arbitrator. Id.
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